TECHNOLOGY WHITE PAPER / CYBER HISTORY, DEFENSE AND FRONTIER TECHNOLOGY

Cyber Risk from Early Hacking to Agentic AI

What past incidents teach about agentic AI, AGI, quantum computing, and recovery

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

Executive summary

FIELD NOTE

Measure effectiveness in restored and trustworthy services, not in the number of alerts closed.

Old failures, new scale

The historical record has repeated patterns: interconnected systems failed together, trusted identities or suppliers widened exposure, response channels were not ready, and service restoration lagged containment. Faster tools make these weaknesses more expensive, but they do not erase the difference between access, impact and recovery. FBI IC3 recorded 1,008,597 complaints and $20.877 billion in reported losses for 2025. This includes reported internet-enabled fraud and is not a tally of all cyberattacks or economic damage. [1]

AI can help harmful actors increase volume and manage more work, and selected provider cases show human-directed automation. That evidence does not establish the prevalence of fully autonomous attacks or remove the need for independent verification. Capabilities vary with permissions, tools and environment. [10] [9]

What to do now

Inventory essential services, assign recovery owners, enforce phishing-resistant authentication where feasible, and test clean restoration. Put AI agents behind a separate permission boundary. Require independent approval for consequential actions and ensure workflows stop when approval, policy or logging fail. Avoid placing the same identity or provider on both sides of a critical control. [3] [5] [8]

Quantum computing creates a distinct long-horizon risk for widely used public-key systems. The practical response is inventory, risk prioritization and planned migration using current standards. A standards deadline is not a scientific forecast; fault-tolerant quantum capability does not itself imply AGI. Treat AGI, superintelligence and a singularity as different hypotheses. This report separates established history, measured current capabilities, and conditional future scenarios. [11]

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

A common lens for comparing incidents

FIELD NOTE

Use the same questions for each case, but preserve what source records cannot tell us.

The six questions

What service mattered? What trust or control assumption failed? What first signal was observable and by whom? What limited the damage? What evidence supported restored operations? What durable changes followed? A case is incomplete if it only explains initial compromise or only identifies a patch. A forced shutdown can be an effective containment decision and still harm service availability. [3] [13]

Use a dated timeline with separate columns for event, detection, public disclosure, containment, restored priority services and verified closure. Confidence and time zone matter. Separate the first suspicious signal from the moment incident command declared the scope known.

Rebound is more than recovery time

Distinguish technical recovery, financial and operational recovery, public trust, remediation, and accountability. A restored customer portal does not mean that access has been fully invalidated, data integrity independently checked, or regulatory obligations resolved. A public apology is not an operational milestone. Record known gaps instead of reporting a single universal time to recovery. [3]


When comparing decades, look for the same structural dependency in different forms. Early networks often lacked coordinated response. Modern enterprises may have integrated services but still lack a separate communication channel or a tested identity recovery plan. The comparison guides controls, not reconstruction of historical intrusions.

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 01 Cyber resilience is a repeating cycle



Reliability and recovery are recurring responsibilities. Readiness, detection, containment, restoration, and learning reinforce each other. Critical service owners should validate recovery against agreed business and safety requirements.

48PEGASUS Research conceptual exhibit. Not empirical data.

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

Who does what and under whose authority

FIELD NOTE

Technical skill is not a moral category. Authorization, conduct and consequences matter.

Distinguish roles

Researchers can discover defects and improve systems under defined authorization and coordinated disclosure. Incident responders preserve evidence and restore services with authorized access. Journalists, archivists, standards bodies and courts contribute different kinds of evidence. Criminal and state-linked actors may have different motivations; neither a nickname nor a headline establishes attribution or collective responsibility. [7]

Profiles distinguish conviction, charge, admission, public assessment and unresolved claims. A court document establishes what the court decided or what a party claimed; procedural posture matters. Response accounts can omit confidential or sensitive information and should not be treated as complete technical records.

Translate the history into responsibilities

A disclosure program needs a published route, dependable acknowledgments, a qualified triage owner and a way to confirm changes. Give reporting parties a safe, clear scope, and verify consent before any intrusive activity. When a service is operated by a supplier, agree who receives reports, who takes technical action and who notifies affected users. [7] [4]

Name a service owner and continuity owner in addition to a technical security owner. Establish how they will handle speed-versus-evidence tradeoffs during an incident. Leadership approval should support, not override, a documented safety decision when operations could affect people or critical services. [3]

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

Capability is not the same as authority

FIELD NOTE

A good benchmark score cannot authorize a system to take an action.

Current systems are shaped by their tools

A text model can propose next steps. An agent can carry out actions using the permissions and tools granted by its environment, retry, or hand work to another component. A workflow can be highly autonomous in one narrow task without general intelligence. Persistent memory, broad access and automatic retries can change risk without changing the underlying model’s benchmark score. [9] [8]

Observed assisted misuse can indicate what a particular provider saw in accounts or on its platform. It does not represent activity on systems the provider cannot observe, disclose or reliably attribute. Do not read provider case counts as statistical rates.

Authority belongs outside the model

Enforce tool access and business rules at an independent layer. Separate viewing, proposing and executing. Require a meaningful approval showing the operation, target and expected consequences, and ensure it expires before a changed action. A model can produce text claiming approval, but only the authoritative approval record can authorize a tool. [6] [8]

An evaluator can examine how a model handled contextual requests and warnings in a defined setup. A system owner must additionally prove that permissions, monitoring, containment, human oversight and rollback work in the deployment actually used. A benchmark and the effectiveness of a runtime control are separate evidence streams.

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

Quantum risk does not require a singularity

FIELD NOTE

Act on cryptographic exposure that is visible today; treat arrival dates as uncertain.

Separate clocks

The protection lifetime of data, the time required to upgrade infrastructure, and the date of any cryptographically relevant quantum machine are different clocks. Long-lived confidential traffic may warrant early action because the data can still matter by the time computers change. Long-lived signatures, roots of trust and embedded equipment create different timing issues. NIST’s October 2026 transition guidance supplies migration milestones, not an arrival date for a disruptive machine. [11] [12]

A physical qubit count or a demonstration of error-corrected memory is not evidence of a system capable of defeating current deployed public-key systems at scale. Workload, error correction, logical capacity and sustained runtime would matter.

Keep AI and quantum claims separate

A quantum processor is a form of computing hardware for suitable tasks, not a switch that makes an AI system broadly intelligent. AI may help some aspects of quantum research and quantum hardware may eventually assist particular calculations. Either claim requires a defined practical workload and a comparison with classical baselines.

AGI, superintelligence and a singularity also are not synonyms. Put claims about breadth, competence, decision authority and recursively accelerating development in different columns. A high predicted impact with low evidence may justify reversible preparations, but not a declaration that the scenario already occurred. [8] [11]

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

Evidence hierarchy and limits

FIELD NOTE

Incidents, legal allegations, model evaluations, and theoretical feasibility require different evidence.

Match the source to the claim

Use a first-party incident report for dates and acknowledged consequences, a regulator or court record for the official action, and a technical standard for recommendations and scope. A complaint report counts what was submitted. Data contributors and selection processes differ by provider. When source methods do not support national extrapolation or causal attribution, leave the stronger claim unresolved. [1] [2]

Model cards are first-party evidence of what a provider tested, not independent measurement of how a product behaves everywhere. The owner’s tool setup, allowed actions and sensitivity of work matter. An agent evaluation cannot establish a frequency of malicious outcomes among all organizations. [9]

Separate confidence by field

An outage can be confirmed while attacker attribution remains uncertain. A guilty plea can establish conduct in a defined case without establishing a wider campaign. A company’s stated recovery date can coexist with unknown data integrity or long-term cost. Record verified facts, claims by named sources, assessments and speculation as separate types.

This is a selected narrative review through November 19, 2026. Figures are bounded by sources; conceptual schematics are not measurements. Technical details that could facilitate intrusion or copycat activity are excluded. Readers can use the decision tools without attempting to reproduce a breach. [3] [7]

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EXECUTIVE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE

Priorities for the different readers

FIELD NOTE

Direct attention to decisions whose costs and reversibility are measurable.

Boards, operators and public organizations

Boards should identify essential services and approve explicit recovery objectives. Test an extended outage with one unavailable supplier, identity service or command channel. Ask when human supervision or domain expertise could actually intervene, not only whether the policy says a human is involved. Review whether the backup depends on the same failed provider. [4] [13]

Operators should compare historical incident evidence with current procedures. Build a record of health, containment, isolation and restore events. Require a named authority for changes that can affect essential services and a way to back out or stop propagation.

Small teams, schools and individual households

Focus first on a small controls stack: reliable recovery for core accounts, distinct identities for critical functions, phishing-resistant methods where supported, independent approval of sensitive payments, a verified backup restore and a trusted reporting route. Avoid measuring preparedness by a purchased security tool alone. [5]

For families and schools, a clear contact protocol for money, urgent messages and impersonation can reduce reliance on a training game or on identifying visual flaws. Confirm unusual requests through an existing trusted route and support people who report concerns early. Education is one control, not a substitute for secure workflow design.

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

What the word hacker used to mean

Culture before crime

Observe the conduct

Permission is not identity

A craft label, not a verdict

MIT’s Tech Model Railroad Club preserves a dictionary based on a 1959 version written by ■[*REDACTED*]■. Its playful technical vocabulary illustrates one influential early meaning of hacking as a clever or unconventional way of making a system do something. It does not establish a single inventor of the word or a universal ethic for everyone later called a hacker. Over time, journalists and investigators used the same label for activities as different as instrumenting software, probing under contract and stealing data. [14]

The useful distinction is not appearance, employment, age, affiliation or self-description. Ask who authorized the activity, what purpose was declared, what limits applied, and what actually happened.

A defensible vocabulary

Refer to a person as a researcher, maintainer, incident responder, user, operator, defendant or convicted participant only when the record supports it. Label alleged conduct as alleged. A research title is neither blanket permission nor a reason to assume misconduct. “White hat” and “black hat” may be recognizable shorthand, but they conceal how roles, motives and authorization can change across time. [33] [30]

Applied today, the same analysis helps categorize agent-driven work. A tool cannot grant itself new rights merely by producing a persuasive rationale. Responsibility stays with the organizations and people who authorize, supervise and document its use.

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[*REDACTED*] and the culture of evidence

1947 artifact

Evidence over folklore

Debugging is not an attack

What the logbook establishes

A surviving 1947 Harvard Mark II logbook records an actual moth found in a machine component. The National Museum of American History attributes the artifact to the work of the Mark II team, in which [*REDACTED*] worked, but notes it was probably not [*REDACTED*]'s own book. "Bug" had already been used to describe engineering faults before electronic computers, so claiming [*REDACTED*] invented the word turns an excellent documented example into an unsupported origin story. [15]

The record concerns an equipment fault, not hostile access. It belongs here as prehistory of diagnosing computing problems, not as an attack case.

What translates to cybersecurity

Keep contemporaneous artifacts rather than reconstructing convenient stories later. Timestamp what the team observed, distinguish event from explanation and preserve alternative readings when the evidence does not establish causation. Failed equipment, mistakes, malicious action and a dependent service outage can look similar at first. The decision to investigate is not itself an attribution.

For executives, require a chronology that can be independently checked. For responders, record what was ruled out as well as what was confirmed. For users affected by an incident, separate restoration of the service from closure of the investigation. A clean logbook does not guarantee complete visibility, but it makes mistakes discoverable. [20]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[*REDACTED*], [*REDACTED*] and trust at internet scale

1976 publication

2015 ACM award

Identity still matters

The constructive turn

[*REDACTED*] and [*REDACTED*]'s 1976 paper helped establish modern public-key cryptography and digital signatures. ACM awarded them the 2015 [*REDACTED*] [*REDACTED*] Award and emphasized the contribution to secure communication over networks used by people who cannot independently arrange a shared secret for every connection. This is a history of defensive capability: it altered what internet commerce and distributed services could reasonably trust. It is not a claim that two people invented every underlying primitive or every deployed protocol. [16]

Cryptographic designs support confidentiality or authenticity under stated assumptions. They do not, alone, determine whether a user intended an action or whether an organization should authorize it.

How foundations become governance

Operate keys, certificates and identities as governed assets. Inventory which services can sign decisions or exchanges, who can revoke trust, and what happens during renewal or migration. Make independent verification possible where data or software crosses organizational boundaries.

The quantum connection is a migration problem as much as a mathematical one. Even if a replacement is ready, ownership records, vendor dependencies, compatibility and difficult-to-update devices can make transition slow. From the historical standardization lesson, anticipate deployment friction instead of waiting for confidence about the precise date of a future capability. Secure transformations need coordination, fallback and verification, not just a new algorithm label. [16] [22]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[redacted] and resilient network design

Infrastructure pioneer

Prevent failure by design

Security includes availability

Design against ordinary failure

The Internet Hall of Fame credits [redacted] with designing the spanning tree algorithm that made larger Ethernet networks practical and notes her work as an author in networking and security. That design contribution illustrates a distinction often lost when the story begins with a malicious actor: availability is shaped first by assumptions built into how the network routes and recovers. Designers can make whole classes of ordinary failure manageable before incident responders ever arrive. [17]

Networks can be disrupted by an accident, a dependency or a deliberate operation. The external symptom does not tell the responder which occurred.

Translate the design lesson to AI

Map dependencies that silently became essential: identity providers, routing, credential validation, processing services and vendor-managed control planes. Decide what must remain usable when one fails. Give critical services practical limits and safe ways to continue when automated components become unreliable.

Do not take “we have redundancy” as evidence that redundancy works. Ask whether failover depends on the same identity, provider or operator, and use controlled exercises to discover common dependencies. The objective is to bound the effect of a local fault. For autonomous systems, the analogous requirement is independent control over authorization and shutdown: capability can be distributed, but limits must still be enforceable. [17] [22]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[redacted] and the small unexplained discrepancy

1980s laboratory case

Evidence from operations

Do not chase every anomaly

The observation that changed the question

An archived U.S. computing symposium biography records that [redacted], an astronomer at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, followed a 75-cent computer accounting discrepancy that led to a computer espionage investigation. The amount is memorable, but it is not a loss estimate, an attacker fingerprint or evidence that a cheap reconciliation signal always detects a serious incident. Its value was that an unexpected result could be compared to an independent system of record. [18]

Distinguish the first visible signal from the eventual determination. Discovery begins as a discrepancy; independent evidence can strengthen, narrow or refute the initial hypothesis.

The modern detection lesson

Build reconciliations across authorization, observed activity, and business consequences. A change approved for a limited period should match the period and identity in the access record. A model-approved action should have a separate record of any external transaction that followed. Use errors as prompts for human review, not as standalone conclusions.

Budget for triage. A genuine exception trail helps prioritize anomalies by scope and consequence; indiscriminately logging everything can overwhelm the organization and create unnecessary privacy risk. Include useful event context and tightly govern retention and access. If an important record is absent, state that absence directly rather than declaring that nothing happened. [18] [20]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[redacted] and the aftermath of a worm

November 1988

1990 conviction

From incident to institutions

The event and the legal record

The FBI records that a self-propagating program released on November 2, 1988 spread across connected systems and impaired their ability to operate. Its retrospective estimates approximately 6,000 affected computers out of about 60,000 then connected; that is an estimate, not a fully reconciled public count. Operators observed failures across institutions, and investigators later identified Cornell graduate student [redacted]. The FBI reports a 1990 jury verdict, making [redacted] the first person convicted under the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. [19]

Public shorthand sometimes calls this the first Internet attack. “An early major Internet-wide incident” is better supported than an absolute claim of historical priority.

The rebound that mattered

The lasting change was an institutional one. After the incident, DARPA asked Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute to establish a computer emergency response capability. The episode exposed how hard it was for operations staff to collaborate under network-wide stress even when each site had technical expertise. [20] [22]

Scale matters independently of intent. Once a system autonomously creates work for many machines at once, its effect can exceed forecasts drawn from a single trial. Today that lesson supports conservative access and rate limits, bounded deployment, separate monitoring and a shutdown mechanism that does not assume the automated system remains cooperative.

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

REDACTED and incident-response institutions

1988 SEI CERT/CC

1990 FIRST

Coordination without command

A neutral coordination role

In a retrospective interview, CERT leader *REDACTED* described early CERT as a service organization without the authority to direct every network owner. Its value lay in making separate operators more effective. Carnegie Mellon describes the center’s role in sharing remediation information and serving as a neutral intermediary among researchers and organizations. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams traces its own founding in 1990 to coordination problems that became visible in the early network incidents of 1988 and 1989. [21] [20] [22]

The institutional move was from a few local technical contacts toward persistent, identifiable teams with defined responsibilities.

What a smaller organization can copy

Decide in advance who owns technical response, who can pause service, who approves statements and who contacts the vendor or sector coordination group. Maintain independent communications and make arrangements for weekends and absences. Do not depend on a single staff member or on the service that is already unavailable.

Practise exchanging a small, verified incident summary across teams. Separate observed conditions, confidence levels, protective actions and unanswered questions. Preserve customer privacy and tell partners what is authorized for onward sharing. Establish criteria for when to escalate uncertainty rather than waiting for agreement about every detail. Coordination is an operating discipline, not an automatic result of buying a security product. [22] [30]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[*REDACTED*], [*REDACTED*] and public accountability

1998 Senate hearing

Researchers as witnesses

Separate claims from outcomes

Technical warning becomes public testimony

The L0pht was a group of independent security researchers whose work reached the U.S. Senate in 1998. Members included [redacted] and [redacted]. The committee's subsequent activities report preserves the hearing's emphasis on widespread dependency and weak assurance, while [redacted]'s first-person account describes how the group worked with journalists to bring research into public discussion. Strong claims made in testimony were warnings within a hearing, not evidence that the projected event actually occurred. [23] [24]

What made this phase distinctive was the shift from fixing a local incident to challenging what public institutions expected of suppliers and networks.

Put claims through assurance review

Public testimony can make unknown risk visible, but a risk decision must still ask what was demonstrated, what was inferred, who owned corrective work and whether an independent party checked its completion. Use controlled testing and retain evidence internally as appropriate without publishing replicable harmful details.

Apply this discipline to AI vendor demonstrations. Separate a bounded evaluation from the actual product's permissions, monitoring, and scale. A startling claim deserves investigation; it does not become a reliable operational forecast simply because it was heard in a prominent room. Leadership should be able to convert credible concerns into reviewable corrective actions, not just striking headlines. [30]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[*REDACTED*] and the problem with celebrity accounts

1995 arrest is documented

Separate prior sentence and new claims

Identity controls over mythology

Status and sourcing

A contemporaneous DOJ announcement records that agents arrested [*REDACTED*] in North Carolina on February 15, 1995 and describes a prior computer-related case for which he had received a one-year sentence. The announcement evidences that arrest, the existence of the prior sentence and the investigative officials' account at that time. It should not be used as a verdict on allegations then pending or as a comprehensive judgment covering everything subsequently attributed to him. [25]

[*REDACTED*]'s place in popular history illustrates a reporting hazard. Repetition of a dramatic claim does not turn an allegation, an anecdote or a marketing description into a court finding.

Organizational controls over personality

The appropriate modern lesson is not to imitate or sensationalize the conduct. It is to make verification a designed step whenever someone requests access, a credential change or an unusual transfer. Technical familiarity, urgency or confidence are not identity evidence; approvals and independent confirmation should not depend on the persuasiveness of a requester.

For investigative or legal summaries, preserve event dates and cite the charge, admission, verdict or sentence that supports each factual statement. Avoid confidently assigning actions that have no public record. Staff awareness is helpful, but workflow rules and accountable approval points are what let someone stop and verify a questionable request without personal friction. [25] [33]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

■*REDACTED*■ and industrial-scale payment fraud

2009 guilty pleas

2010 sentence

Measure the exposure chain

Established conduct and scale

The Justice Department records ■■*REDACTED*■■'s 2009 guilty plea in a conspiracy involving computer intrusions against retail and financial organizations and stolen payment-card information. A later DOJ summary records his March 2010 sentence of 20 years. These outcomes establish the conduct covered by the pleas and sentence; they do not make every number or assertion from an earlier indictment a finding. DOJ's later account of investigative work emphasizes collaboration across cases and use of computer forensics alongside conventional law-enforcement work. [26] [27]

Victims were not limited to the operator of one system. Payment records connect merchants, financial institutions and individual account holders.

Prevention and rebound across firms

Read the case as evidence of downstream exposure that accumulates when a valuable data type flows through several organizations. Limit retained sensitive data, make payment-environment boundaries reviewable and know how partners can suspend or verify risky activity. Measure affected accounts and data actually exposed separately from records present or transactions potentially affected.

Avoid the claim that a prosecution alone repaired customer harm. Institutions still had to scope exposure, coordinate notifications and protect affected consumers. Review the same dependencies when deploying automated services over financial or identity information. A faster workflow can extend the scale of a mistake if old limits on access or retention are not carried forward. [26] [27]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[*REDACTED*], [*REDACTED*] and authorized public testing

2016 pilot

138 unique eligible findings

Scope is the safety boundary

A bounded public program

The Department of Defense’s 2016 Hack the Pentagon pilot explicitly invited eligible participants to report vulnerabilities on a limited set of public-facing websites; critical networks were not in scope. The department’s announcement names [*REDACTED*] [*REDACTED*] and [*REDACTED*] among participants, describes more than 1,400 invited registrants and more than 250 people submitting reports, and identifies 138 findings deemed legitimate, unique and eligible for a bounty. These are pilot results, not a measure of every weakness or proof that a bounty program guarantees safety. [28]

The event illustrates a deliberate arrangement: permission and scope were determined before testing, and the department assigned staff to triage and remediate.

What public discovery does not replace

A bounty pays under the terms of a particular program. A disclosure policy creates a reporting path, which may exist without payments. Neither substitutes for routine engineering review, incident preparedness, or verification that a fix remains effective. Publish where reports go and what limits apply; resource triage so legitimate reports are not lost among duplicates or unrelated claims. [30] [29]

An AI-assisted report is still subject to human review and its owner’s authorization. Prefer workflows that keep the vendor in control of assessment, avoid sensitive production data and retain enough internal evidence to confirm that the safe remediation has actually been applied.

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

Mirai convictions and responsibility in distributed systems

2017 pleas

2018 federal sentences

Case records, not an attack tutorial

The people and the record

DOJ records December 2017 guilty pleas by [*REDACTED*], [*REDACTED*] and [*REDACTED*] in Alaska in connection with the Mirai botnet. The September 2018 sentencing announcement describes probation, community service, restitution and ongoing cooperation after extensive assistance to the FBI. Those details describe a specific federal case, not a claim that the defendants were responsible for every incident publicly associated with the same software, variant or label. [34]

The defining operational fact is that a collection of internet-connected devices was taken over without owners' permission and used collectively for disruption. Individual owners could face little warning while the aggregate impact fell elsewhere.

Treat the ecosystem as a unit of defense

Assign real owners to embedded and unmanaged systems and review what happens after a product leaves active support. Require safer defaults, credential management, secure maintenance, update expectations and a way to remove obsolete devices. Large customers can shift the market through purchasing requirements rather than expecting each consumer to perform expert defensive monitoring.

Cooperation after conviction may help investigators but does not erase responsibility or substitute for safer products. Likewise, an agent running in many places should not be trusted simply because each isolated instance looks low risk. Measure the combined effective authority and enforce limits outside the agent. [34] [20]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

[*REDACTED*] and the value of cross-company disclosure

2021 sworn testimony record

Discovery by a victim team

Correlated dependencies

An executive account supported by a public record

In February 2021 Senate testimony, then-[*REDACTED*] chief executive [*REDACTED*] described how his organization investigated an intrusion into its own environment and connected the event to a trusted software supply chain. The testimony is an important first-party account for understanding recognition and disclosure, not an independent audit of every claim or of every customer's exposure. It shows the significance of looking beyond the first local alert when independent evidence points to a shared supplier. [35]

A figure associated with discovery is not its sole author. Investigators, vendors, government counterparts and affected organizations each controlled different facts and different decisions.

How the response model applies now

Notify affected parties on a verified basis, distinguish suspected exposure from observed compromise, and coordinate with the entity that can disable or replace trust in a shared dependency. Document which owned services depend on externally produced software, identity, or automated decisions. If several functions rely on one protocol or vendor, apparent operational diversity may mask shared exposure.

Apply that test to model and tool providers. Contract for usable incident records, retain a way to pause integrations, support manual continuity and define the conditions for restoring access. The important measure is time to a verified protective decision across organizations, not simply how fast a vendor drafts a notice. [35] [30]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

Citizen Lab and consent-based investigation

Civil society research

Consent is a design constraint

Attribution is layered

Why evidence from outside industry matters

Citizen Lab researcher [redacted]'s 2022 testimony describes work with high-risk civil society groups and credits researcher [redacted]'s role in the program's discoveries about commercial surveillance. The group's study with Thai partners iLaw and DigitalReach describes obtaining forensic evidence from participants who consented. These sources describe community-based research, not an exhaustive count of spyware use or independent verification of all parties implicated by any attribution. [36] [37]

People at risk are often invisible in commercial telemetry. Consent, data minimization and secure communications affect whether the investigation can help them without adding exposure.

Separate product from operator

Evidence may support identification of a tool family, linkage to a distributor or a finding about a particular device without establishing who made or approved the surveillance decision. State those propositions separately. A public report can be strong on one attribution layer while explicitly uncertain on another.

For contemporary incidents, use narrow collection approved by the people and organizations involved, preserve needed records, minimize secondary exposure, and coordinate necessary disclosures with those at risk. A report on a politically sensitive incident may be technically defensible and still cause harm if it needlessly identifies vulnerable participants. Do not equate protection of identity with a lower evidentiary standard. [36] [37]

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

Ransomware figures and the distinction between disruption and guilt

NetWalker sentence in 2022

LockBit indictment in 2024

No guilt finding implied by charges

Compare documented case stages

DOJ reports that [redacted] *REDACTED* [redacted] was sentenced in 2022 to 20 years in prison and ordered to forfeit $21.5 million in connection with NetWalker ransomware conduct. That is a specific sentencing outcome; it is not an estimate of worldwide losses or a tally of victims compensated. By contrast, a May 2024 indictment alleged [redacted] *REDACTED* [redacted] developed and administered LockBit. The indictment is an accusation, not a verdict. Convictions of separate affiliates do not establish guilt of the person named in a different case. [38] [39] [40]

The cases illustrate relationships between developers, administrators and participants. They do not imply that role labels have the same legal meaning in every proceeding.

Disruption is useful but bounded

A law-enforcement disruption may reduce immediate operational capacity and provide assistance to some victims, while remaining distinct from permanent elimination of the threat, restitution, a prosecution result, or recovery of a particular service. Organizations should still verify their own recovery and track copied data risk and continuity even if a public takedown is announced. [40]

When measuring progress, keep separate columns for infrastructure disabled, defendants charged, judicial outcomes, assistance available and recurrence. Use precise, dated public descriptions instead of assuming an identical outcome across associated investigations. Success against an organization is meaningful even when it does not end all crime in the category.

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HACKING HISTORY AND THE PEOPLE BEHIND IT

The rules of good-faith research

Authorization and care

Disclosure is a process

Policy is not universal immunity

The legal and policy boundary

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2021 [*REDACTED*] decision interpreted one provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, distinguishing access to information outside authorized areas from an improper purpose for accessing information someone was already entitled to obtain. The 2022 DOJ charging policy directs federal prosecutors not to charge good-faith security research as defined by the policy. A court interpretation and prosecutorial guidance are distinct. Neither is a worldwide license or a substitute for clear authorization, other legal duties or professional advice. [32] [33]

Security teams should define limits and contact channels explicitly, rather than assuming participants understand informal conventions.

Turn ethics into a service

CISA’s 2020 directive requires covered federal executive agencies to publish a vulnerability disclosure policy. CERT/CC documents coordination roles, and the IETF’s 2022 informational RFC 9116 defines a machine-readable means of advertising how to contact a reporting program. These are complementary: a discoverable address is only useful if a staffed team can receive, assess and communicate about a report; neither a contact file nor a broad slogan creates permission for out-of-scope activity. [29] [30] [31]


Keep ownership, human approval and stopping rules outside automated tools. Protect the reporter and the public, document changes, and verify remediation before celebrating closure. That is the ethical connection between the people, cases and institutions in this chapter.

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 02 Responsible disclosure assigns clear roles



A researcher, coordinator, product owner and affected users have different responsibilities. Agree on scope, milestones and communication. Public notices should help affected users protect themselves without creating unnecessary harm. Paths and timelines vary.

48PEGASUS Research conceptual exhibit. Not empirical data.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

1988

Availability shock

Federal conviction

[*REDACTED*] Worm: the limits of an informal Internet

Known event and detection

On November 2, 1988, a self-propagating program overloaded computers on the early Internet. The FBI describes an estimate of roughly 6,000 affected machines, but the historical figures are not a complete host census or an appropriate denominator for today’s networks. Administrators saw critical computing resources consumed and services become unusable. The harm came from compounding behavior, not a requirement for each victim to be individually chosen. [41]

What helped stop disruption

Administrators interrupted network connectivity and collaborated on countermeasures in a setting with fewer formal reporting channels than today. Separately, the FBI conducted an investigation after the incident became public. [redacted] [*REDACTED*] [redacted] was convicted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; the investigative record should not be treated as proof of every technical account circulated after the event. [41]

What rebounded

The incident helped drive formal coordination across institutions. The FBI describes the creation of the first computer emergency response team after the event. The lasting change was not the removal of one program but the expectation that organizations should share incident information and have a prepared response contact. Individual restoration times are not consistently recorded in the public case history. [41]

Present relevance

The equivalent design risk today is any automated process that can act on many systems without independent rate, scope, and stop controls. Contain effects before establishing perfect attribution. Self-propagation is a historical fact here, not an analogy establishing that contemporary AI already behaves in the same way. Exercises should verify that a failing service can be paused without relying on the same disrupted communications channel.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

Mail-era worms: why human trust became a system risk

Early mass adoption

Social trust

Coordination

What changed

The spread of electronic mail made familiar interpersonal signals part of computing risk. In May 2000 the “Love Bug” caused worldwide disruption; the FBI’s congressional testimony later described it in the history of Internet worms. Modern communications carry more information and reach more devices, but the useful comparison is misplaced trust in routine material, not any particular historical technical mechanism. [42]

Recognition under noisy conditions

A sharp rise in similar reports and abnormal service demand can point to a common problem, even when users experience it differently. A responder should preserve a few well-scoped observations before declaring that every anomaly has the same cause. Early official retrospective sources do not provide comparative telemetry for all affected organizations, so they cannot establish typical detection or recovery time. [42]

Containment and recovery

Defenders used coordination and protective controls appropriate to the affected communication systems; once isolated disruption was understood, service restoration had to avoid resuming the same harmful behavior. For current organizations, an approved alternate notification channel lets teams reach users even when normal messaging is impaired. A controlled return to service also helps separate residual queued work from new warning signs. [42] [78]

Modern parallel

Synthetic voice and text can make deception more persuasive, but older incidents already showed that a familiar identity is not the same as authority. Verify consequential requests in a trusted channel and make clear who may approve account, payment or access changes. Do not make a user’s ability to recognize unfamiliar phrasing the sole safety control.

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
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
Exhibit 03 From network incidents to shared-service failures

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / SELECTED HISTORICAL TIMELINE

From network incidents to shared-service failures

Selected events. Markers are chronological, not severity.





Selected cases illustrate shifts in the services and dependencies affected. Milestones mark incident years, not a complete history or consistent measure of harm. Placement is in chronological order rather than scaled to elapsed years. See the historical casebook and its original sources.

48PEGASUS Research timeline; individual primary records are cited in the casebook.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[*REDACTED*]: payment security and an outside signal

2013

Retail payments

Distinct affected categories

What the witness said

[*REDACTED*] told Congress that the Justice Department notified it of suspicious payment-card activity on December 12, 2013. An outside signal can identify consequences that an organization cannot see from its own application logs. The witness identified approximately 40 million customers affected in the payment-card category and up to 70 million in the separate personal-data category. The populations may overlap; they should not be added as distinct people. [43]

Why scope mattered

The business had to determine what happened, which channels and periods were affected, and what protection customers and financial institutions needed. A finding about retail payment records does not automatically describe online transactions or establish how every individual was harmed. Broad references to third-party access belong in a control discussion, not an incident recreation.

From containment to remedy

Target testified that it mobilized outside expertise and acted to stop the unauthorized activity, working with law enforcement and financial partners. Follow-up and customer communications continued after immediate containment. Those are separate milestones: compromised activity stopped, payment services stable, and customer remedial actions underway do not mean the same thing. The earlier witness account should not be mistaken for a final loss estimate. [43]

Modern parallel

Give third-party access a defined purpose and expiration; name the organization that reviews unusual activity. If a bank, partner or regulator calls with a plausible warning, on-call leaders should be able to verify the caller and rapidly compare incident observables. Third-party access should be measured against the data and operations reachable, not just against whether the partner has a contract. [78]

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

OPM: an incident may outlast the exposed system

2015

Federal records

Privacy recovery

Discoveries and scope

The Office of Personnel Management identified a personnel-data breach in April 2015 involving about 4.2 million current and former federal employees. It then reported a separate, related incident in background-investigation systems involving 21.5 million people. The second group included some people outside the federal workforce. Neither figure is a measure of how many people subsequently experienced fraud; combining the two without de-duplication is misleading. [44] [45]

Response and uncertainty

OPM notified affected people and described an interagency forensic response. Its contemporaneous notice assessed that the adversary was no longer active in its network based on the evidence available at that time. The conclusion did not imply that previously copied data were returned, no privacy risk remained, or other affected environments were independently certified clean. [44]

Rebound measured against verified controls

GAO’s 2017 follow-up found 11 of 19 US-CERT recommendations completed; action had been taken on the other eight, with four of those actions requiring further improvement. GAO also found weaknesses in tracking expected completion dates and validating effectiveness. A later 2024 review examined different systems under DOD’s Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and identified continuing governance and privacy-control needs. This was not a finding that the original incident continued. [45] [46]

Modern parallel

Old records can remain sensitive long after a service is rebuilt. Minimize retention where authorized, impose stronger controls on exceptional access, and define how downstream partners must respond when identity data have been exposed. Report corrective-action progress with evidence that a safeguard works, not a count of closed tickets.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

Mirai: devices affected elsewhere can interrupt your service

2016

DDoS

Shared internet dependency

What happened and how it was recognized

In 2016, networks of compromised connected devices were involved in denial-of-service incidents that affected downstream internet services. Justice Department accounts distinguish later individual pleas and investigations, including a 2020 plea relating to attacks against Dyn and other targets, from the earlier cases about originating botnets. A service provider can experience interruption even when most participating devices and the systems that rely on its service are operated by different parties. [47] [48]

Detection is local; the failure is distributed

Operators and users encounter slow or unavailable service, while providers can distinguish excess traffic and breakdowns of expected demand patterns. These official criminal case records establish roles and consequences, not complete timing at every downstream company. They should not be cited as though all outages had one source or every participating device was known.

What rebounded

Providers mitigated the disruptions and justice authorities arrested or prosecuted people in distinct investigations. Restoration of a provider’s service is separate from cleanup of the broad connected-device population. A guilty plea establishes the specific conduct admitted, not responsibility by all the parties covered across multiple proceedings. The broader dependency persisted, creating incentives for better device lifecycle management and continuity design. [47] [48]

Modern parallel

Inventory dependency on authoritative internet services and assess whether a supposed alternate has different upstream infrastructure. Exercise failover before it is needed and verify consumers can find the alternate. Device defaults and update support are governance issues as much as technical properties. A healthy application cannot overcome every failure at its dependencies.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

WannaCry: restoration is a health-service outcome

2017

England NHS

Outage versus clinical effects

Detection and immediate response

The UK National Audit Office describes the May 2017 WannaCry disruption as the first ransomware attack of this scale experienced by the NHS. Multiple services independently recognized disruption and the health system coordinated a response. Organizations with unsupported or unpatched software were susceptible; exposure did not mean that all such organizations were infected. Some organizations shut down services as a precaution, so received infection and operational disruption are different denominators. [49] [50]

Measure the disruption accurately

NAO estimated more than 19,000 appointments would have been cancelled based on partial data. Its review found that some emergency services diverted patients, while emergency care continued. Unknown follow-up should not be presented as proof of no patient harm. The later NHS review noted nuances and challenges classifying organizational impact. [49] [50]

Recover care rather than devices alone

NHS services used continuity measures and restoration work, but the status of a hospital workstation was not a complete measure of care recovery. A patient still needs access, an appointment rebooked where necessary, and a reliable record of care delivered while systems were unavailable. For a continuity dashboard, pair device recovery with cancelled and rescheduled appointments, delayed results and affected locations. [49] [50]

Control changes

The reviews emphasize incident coordination, maintained systems, cyber alerts implemented and verified, and recovery exercises. Patch delivery is not the same as protective deployment, and patching is not a substitute for service continuity. Test fallback with the workers expected to operate it and plan for reconciliation when digital systems return.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

NotPetya: destructive incidents can travel across borders

2017

Destructive malware

Operational continuity

Scope and attribution

NotPetya caused broad disruption in June 2017. U.S. prosecutors later charged six Russian military intelligence officers in connection with destructive operations, including NotPetya. The charges are allegations, not a conviction of all defendants. [*REDACTED*]'s annual report independently confirms the company's global business disruption and estimates approximately $250–300 million in company losses across such categories as lost revenue and restoration and operating expense. It is not an estimate of world totals. [51] [52]

Visibility under shared failure

When multiple business units lose service together, lack of an independent administrative or recovery channel can complicate investigation. The high-level record supports widespread destruction and substantial cross-border effects. It does not justify treating every company's outage or response as identical. The recognized harm also did not depend on every affected entity being a specifically intended target.

What rebound means here

[*REDACTED*]'s annual report records both operational effects and restoration costs; a narrower service milestone should not be described as zero remaining cost. Defensive teams need a known-good restoration authority, clean copies, and independent ways to confirm business transactions. A demand for payment does not establish that complete recovery is possible through payment; this episode is an example of destructive behavior. [51] [52]

Modern parallel

Treat recovery architecture as a dependency graph: access to recovery materials, system configuration, and responsible personnel should not all disappear when one enterprise system fails. Maintain an offline resource and alternate approval process. Exercise recovery in priority order rather than measuring success by the number of servers restarted.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[*REDACTED*]: verified remediation beats a patch bulletin

2017

Personal data

GAO and FTC records

Control failures and detection

GAO identified shortcomings in identifying and correcting a vulnerable system, enforcing segmentation, and detecting or limiting access to sensitive data. [*REDACTED*] became aware of suspicious behavior in late July and began its response. This case should be read as multiple safeguards failing together, not solely a missing patch or a judgment about any one staff member. [53]

Different counts at different dates

GAO reported at least 145.5 million people whose personal information was accessed based on the evidence it reviewed. The FTC's later settlement announcement refers to approximately 147 million. The difference is not an arithmetic error or two separate breaches at the company; each publication used information available within its own scope and time. [53] [54]

Restoring trust and addressing harm

The company acted to investigate, contain and remediate; authorities separately pursued remediation obligations. Regulators announced a settlement of at least $575 million and potentially up to $700 million. Those amounts are settlement terms, not a measure of all societal costs, a maximum imposed fine alone, or an amount proven disbursed to all victims. The oversight record distinguishes preventive obligations from consumer relief. [53] [54]

Lesson for today

Track critical exposure against an inventory you can verify. Assign each exception a time limit, business owner and alternate mitigation. Confirm visibility is working end to end, including expiration management and an independent check that expected monitoring data still arrive. After an incident, measure time to customer protection as well as time to secure the service.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[*REDACTED*]: when the trusted supplier is the multiplier

2020

Supply chain

Exposure is not intrusion

Detection and incident scale

A defender’s investigation pointed to compromise linked to a trusted enterprise software product. GAO and congressional testimony distinguish the estimated 18,000 customers to whom compromised software was sent from the smaller group assessed as follow-on victims. The FBI testified in 2021 that it had then identified nine federal agencies and fewer than 100 nongovernment entities in that latter category. Dates and investigation scopes matter; these are not final, universally comparable counts. [55] [56] [57]

Response under uncertainty

Authorities established a Cyber Unified Coordination Group, and CISA directed federal civilian agencies to disconnect or power down affected products. An immediate safety directive limited exposure but did not establish that all downstream systems had been analyzed. A software version list and a full incident impact assessment answer different questions. [55] [57]

Recovery and post-incident change

Restore confidence in software, identities and connected information, not only the compromised product. GAO highlighted communication, information-sharing and evidence challenges and reported incomplete implementation of foundational supply chain practices. Remediation of a customer endpoint cannot substitute for an independent evaluation of supplier controls or the integrity of downstream systems. [55] [56]

AI ecosystem parallel

An internally approved model, integration, or update can carry substantial delegated authority. Stage changes, maintain independent monitoring, require provenance, and keep emergency access independent of the component being assessed. Even a trusted signature should not replace evidence that the supplier and approved artifact are operating as expected. This is a governance analogy, not a claim of an equivalent AI attack.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[redacted]: operating safely under uncertainty

2021

Critical infrastructure

Restart is not seizure

What was detected

[redacted] reported a ransomware incident in May 2021. Its CEO testified to rapidly stopping pipeline operations to contain the incident and assess the threat. A halt in physical operations does not by itself establish compromise of pipeline controls. In this case, the decision to stop was part of the safety and containment response, and the public record distinguishes the business disruption from confirmed intrusion scope. [58]

What the restart meant

Pipeline restart began on May 12 according to [redacted]'s testimony. Restarting a network of infrastructure is not instantaneous service normalization; it requires operations to verify milestones and communicate which constraints remain. Care in public wording matters when downstream supply and customer behavior may respond to incomplete information. [58]

Separate criminal recovery

DOJ later announced seizure of 63.7 bitcoin then valued at approximately $2.3 million and alleged they represented proceeds of the ransom payment. This is a case-specific enforcement result, not a guarantee of reclaiming payments or a measure of pipeline recovery, business losses, or value on the payment date. Early evidence preservation and reporting serve a different purpose from service restoration. [59]

Modern parallel

A halt decision should be rehearsed with people responsible for safe operation. Define confidence needed for restart, who signs it off, and how billing, dispatch, stakeholder messages and physical safety are verified. Ensure an emergency communication method is not solely dependent on the affected enterprise network. A post-event milestone should state clearly what is back and what remains uncertain.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

Ireland’s HSE: continuity across an entire care network

2021

Conti

Independent review

From disruption to resilience problem

Ireland’s Health Service Executive experienced a major cyber incident on May 14, 2021. The commissioned independent review details how local signs, incident escalation, and national coordination interacted. It identified shortcomings in cybersecurity maturity and ownership, and its evidence demonstrates the importance of acting on warnings even when nobody initially has a complete national view. Not every service or information system was affected in the same way. [60]

Containment costs can be necessary

Defenders acted to reduce exposure across the environment, interrupting service availability while the impact was assessed. For providers, computers and connectivity are not peripheral: diagnostics, referral coordination and appointment flows can all depend on shared systems. The patient-facing consequences must be evaluated independently of the evidence collected for technical analysis. [60]

Rebound and verification

Technical recovery required a coordinated restoration process across critical services; organizational remediation continued well after the initial emergency. HSE governance records show subsequent monitoring and remediation discussions. An agenda discussion documents governance attention, not completion of a control or independently measured reduction in risk. [60] [61]

Present relevance

Give local clinicians fallback pathways and a central process for setting recovery priorities. Record time to safe manual service, backlog and reconciling records, and authority to resume digital workflows. When evidence is incomplete, tell staff what they are permitted to do and what must wait. Rehearse a multi-site outage with external partners rather than relying on a technical tabletop alone.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

Storm-0558: the customer noticed what the provider missed

2023

Cloud identity

Independent observations

What public review established

In May and June 2023 a threat actor known as Storm-0558 accessed Exchange Online mailboxes affecting more than 500 people across 22 organizations according to the Cyber Safety Review Board. The review emphasizes deficiencies in cloud identity safeguards, the stewardship of authentication trust, and provider detection. U.S. State Department personnel identified suspicious activity using available audit data and brought it to [*REDACTED*]'s attention. [62]

Important uncertainty

The board reported that [*REDACTED*] was unable to determine how the relevant trust credential originally came under attacker control. That gap should remain in the account. Knowing what permission boundary failed does not reconstruct the cause of its original compromise. Initial corporate explanations and later independent findings should be presented in their proper date and scope. [62]

Response and recovery

[*REDACTED*] mitigated the incident and worked with affected organizations, while the review documented security and reporting improvements that should follow. An organization needs to consider earlier activity and residual exposure even after a provider invalidates the credential or fixes the affected service. Protecting confidentiality cannot be reduced to restoring service availability. [62]

Modern parallel

Do not place all evidence and all authority inside the same cloud trust boundary. Confirm contractually what logs are available, which events they cover, how long you can access them and how external evidence is preserved. Periodically exercise coordinated revocation and recovery with vendors. The lesson is independent verification, not that a modern authentication mechanism always fails.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[*REDACTED*]: restoring software does not un-disclose data

2023

File transfer

Vendor and tenant impacts

A product finding and many customer questions

[*REDACTED*] disclosed in its fiscal 2023 Form 10-K response to a [*REDACTED*] security incident affecting transfer products. The company stated it remained operational and had not uncovered evidence at the time of filing of related unauthorized activity in its corporate environment. That statement is not reassurance that customers were unaffected. A service provider, a large customer, and people whose information passed through the service can have materially different incident scopes. [63]

Discovery, communication and response

The provider described discovering a problem, mobilizing its response, mitigating affected cloud deployments and supporting customers. Because customer environments varied, a patch notice alone could not answer whether a specific dataset had been exposed. An organization must reconstruct its own data movement and preserve the basis of any notice it sends. [63]

Rebound and legal uncertainty

[*REDACTED*]'s later filings continued to distinguish related costs, insurance and proceedings. The company announced that SEC staff had concluded its investigation without recommending enforcement; that statement about one investigation is not a finding that the incident produced no loss or that different proceedings were resolved. [64] [65]

Modern parallel

File transfer, cloud connectors and agent tools can expose material supplied by many separate organizations. Keep destination and retention inventories, prefer minimum necessary data, and know how to contact downstream owners. Response should reserve separate evidence lanes for product restored, exposure assessed, and notices or customer remedies completed.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[redacted]: payment outages become care risks

2024

Claims clearinghouse

Impact extended into 2025

Recognition and immediate containment

[redacted]'s CEO testified that [redacted] isolated affected systems after discovering the February 2024 cyberattack. His testimony pointed to inadequate multifactor coverage on part of the affected environment. The outage interrupted services that pharmacies and clinicians relied on for claims and related transactions. This is an example of concentrated business dependence, not proof that every customer's network was compromised. [66] [68]

Two impact denominators

AHA testimony described operational and cash-flow strain across providers. HHS states [redacted] notified its Office for Civil Rights on July 31, 2025 that approximately 192.7 million individuals had been impacted. The number is a reported affected-person estimate, not the number of provider systems compromised, denials of care, paid claims, or a measurement of subsequent identity misuse. [68] [67]

Restoration and the cash-flow tail

Public testimony documents staged restoration. Claims processing or eligibility checks coming back online do not mean delayed payments have reached providers or transactions have been reconciled. Business continuity requires testing alternative clearing routes, identifying the backlog that needs human resolution, and documenting whether smaller providers have adequate short-run liquidity. [66] [68]

Modern parallel

Measure single-vendor concentration in transactions, settlement timing and fallback capacity. Do not count the alternate as independent without checking its own underlying providers. Define service-level evidence and practical notice commitments with partners before an outage. Operational and privacy remedies can continue on entirely different clocks.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[*REDACTED*]: a counterexample to attack-by-headline

2024

Nonmalicious outage

Concentration risk

Observed impact, distinct cause

[*REDACTED*] reported in a July 2024 SEC filing that a sensor configuration update caused outages affecting certain Windows systems and stated that the event was not caused by a cyberattack. [*REDACTED*] estimated roughly 8.5 million affected Windows devices. That estimate concerns devices, not distinct people, separate companies, or the number of services interrupted. The continuity lesson is valid even though adversarial intent was absent. [69] [71]

How a routine change becomes systemic

A vendor update can reach many customers in a short period. The official root-cause summary describes issues in validation and handling of the update, and remediation required more than normal software scheduling for affected systems. An incident commander should maintain alternative hypotheses until there is evidence distinguishing malicious activity from faulty deployment. [70]

Rebound and controls

The company reversed the update and developed further mitigations. Organizations still had to restore individual systems and essential workflows; a vendor’s rollback is not necessarily equivalent to endpoint recovery. Staged deployment rings, independent stop authority, out-of-band communications and rollback tests address the concentration risks common to malicious and accidental incidents. [69] [70]

Modern parallel

AI agents can also change many records rapidly under legitimate credentials. Broad reach should require rate limits, narrow scope and auditability independent of the agent. When the same provider controls deployment and telemetry, verify that an internal route can still stop the workflow and capture evidence if its monitoring fails.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

Salt Typhoon: visibility in infrastructure shared by others

2024–2025 disclosures

Telecommunications

Campaign uncertainty

How to describe the public record

The FBI publicly described PRC-affiliated activity known as Salt Typhoon and a compromise of multiple U.S. telecommunications companies. Coordinated government statements and a multinational hardening publication emphasized visibility and protection. The presence of this official attribution is not permission to extend it to every telecommunications disruption, infer undisclosed victims or identify unsupported attacker names. [72] [73]

Detection is not the same as attribution

Network operators need useful telemetry before any specific actor is named. A provider can identify suspicious changes and constrain privileged actions without knowing which government, group or person is responsible. Full discovery chronology and customer-level victim scope are not consistently public, and the absence of such detail should not be filled with conjecture. [72]

Recovery and unfinished questions

Authorities published defensive guidance and sought additional investigative information. This supports response and mitigation but does not verify eradication across all providers, customer notification in all affected areas, or full rebuilding of trust. Individual provider controls require evidence that they are in place, reviewed and independently testable. [72] [73]

Modern parallel

For essential communications, maintain a vetted alternative channel and know which routes it ultimately uses. Define accountable owners for audit collection, review of administrative authority, and fallback restoration. Focus on how to discover unauthorized changes quickly without assuming normal service availability proves communications confidentiality.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

Hive and LockBit: disruption does not erase risk

2023–2024

Law enforcement and recovery

Separate measures

What was interrupted

DOJ reported a coordinated Hive disruption in January 2023, including supplying decryption assistance to victims. It estimated that more than $130 million in ransom demands were averted; this is an agency estimate of avoided payments, not the total cost of affected incidents or the amount of stolen data recovered. DOJ and UK authorities announced coordinated LockBit disruption in February 2024 and offered victim assistance. The two cases describe different operations and populations. [74] [75]

Why counting cases is not enough

Investigative success, service recovery and prevention are separate measures. Some victims may regain files while still incurring investigation and data-exposure costs. Counts of cases, demand amounts, infrastructure seizures and later convictions are not interchangeable. DOJ’s inspector general examined the difficulties of measuring program effectiveness, reinforcing the need to interpret individual announcements narrowly. [77]

Rebound on both sides

DOJ later brought allegations in the LockBit case and described attempts to revive the operation. Indictments allege conduct and should not be treated as verdicts. An interrupted group may not resume its former reach, while some people involved may continue in another operation. The appropriate result is bounded disruption, not a universal claim that the crime is finished. [76]

Present relevance

Offer employees and partners a straightforward path to report events, and prepare evidence-handling arrangements before systems are disrupted. A victim’s priority must still include independent restoration and data-scope determination. Following credible law-enforcement developments can reduce uncertainty, but no organization should predicate continuity on the availability of outside decryption help.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

[*REDACTED*]: replenishment is not recovered property

October 29, 2026

Financial controls

Dated and distinct estimates

Recognition and containment

[*REDACTED*] reported an internal alert about unusually large transfers and opened an investigation on October 29. The company said it suspended withdrawals, worked with partners to freeze assets, and rebuilt or replaced affected systems. This first-party account is provisional, and its description of completed mitigations is not a substitute for independent validation. An approved policy should identify who may suspend material transactions, what authority remains active, and how funds and authorizations are reconciled when service resumes. [79]

The issuer's numbers answer different questions

[*REDACTED*]'s November 3 statement reports about $6.34 billion of assets impacted and roughly $2.85 billion frozen or intercepted, subject to reconciliation and changing valuations. It also stated that as of October 31 it had replenished 98% of affected token assets. On November 13 the company reported completing replenishment while continuing phased withdrawal resumption; some unsupported tokens were assigned a separate process. These are issuer statements. Replenishment can protect customers without returning stolen property, and nominal dollar valuations can move after the incident. [79] [81]

What the Justice Department established

On November 12 DOJ attributed the [*REDACTED*] theft to North Korean actors the FBI calls TraderTraitor, separately from another campaign described in the same release. It reported more than $2.7 billion frozen through collective efforts, including more than $1.2 billion within court-authorized seizure or restraint. The latter is nested within the former. Neither is a final forfeiture or return. Do not add platform and government figures; scope, timing, valuation, and overlap are not reconciled across the two accounts. [80]

Present relevance

Separate independent alerting from payment authority and use meaningful sign-off outside any automated agent proposing the transaction. Test whether stopping the front end also constrains actions already authorized elsewhere. Record separately which services are available again, which customers are made whole, and which property is restrained, returned, or still outstanding.

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
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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 04 Asset impact and legal restraint are not recovery

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / EVIDENCE EXHIBIT

Asset impact and legal restraint are not recovery



[*REDACTED*]'s November 3 estimate put impacted assets at about $6.34 billion. DOJ on November 12 reported more than $2.7 billion collectively frozen and over $1.2 billion under court-authorized seizure or restraint, nested within the frozen amount. Bars show the threshold for each DOJ figure, not the final balance. Customer replenishment and actual return of stolen assets are separate outcomes.

[*REDACTED*] initial incident update and DOJ November 12 release; see the casebook and source register.

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How to tell whether an organization truly rebounded

Cross-case synthesis

Operational evidence

Verification gates

Distinguish four milestones

Containment prevents additional loss in the known scope. Technical recovery restores resources to a trusted state. Business recovery measures the service experienced by customers and staff. Corrective-action validation tests whether protective changes work and whether leadership owns remaining risks. A report can close one without closing the others. NIST frames incident response as part of ongoing cybersecurity risk management rather than a stand-alone emergency activity. [78]

What counts as evidence

For containment, document what remains isolated and which observations support that status. For technical recovery, use acceptance tests and independent monitoring. For business recovery, record throughput, remaining backlog, data reconciliation and impacted users. For validated remediation, name the independent tester, document scope and publish follow-up assignments and dates. OPM’s GAO follow-up illustrates why action completed is not the same as independently shown effective. [45]

Avoid the speed trap

Average restoration time compresses very different services and hides consequences for the last affected group. Report a timeline by function and denote any clock whose detection or completion date is unknown. Define whether the clock starts at first observed harm, formal declaration or discovery. If a safety or confidentiality concern remains unresolved, a fast restart may not indicate good performance. [49] [67]

Apply to agentic systems


A rollback must withdraw delegated authority and verify consequential actions already taken outside the tool. A model being offline does not reverse sent notices, altered records or disclosure of data. Require action logs, lower-risk mode and an independent way to pause execution. Historical cases show why evidence boundaries and business obligations matter even when the technology changes.

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 05 From first signal to safe restoration



The incident lead coordinates containment and evidence preservation while service owners plan safe operation. Restoration and reopening are distinct decisions. Local safety, legal, operational and notification requirements can change the order.

48PEGASUS Research conceptual exhibit. Not empirical data.

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INCIDENT CASEBOOK AND RECOVERY

What history can and cannot predict

Patterns, not frequencies

Unknowns are findings

Use counterexamples

Recurring lessons

The cases show repeated dependencies: unverified trust, inadequate isolation, missing independent observations, uneven recovery authority, and dilution of accountability across suppliers. They are selected for their explanatory value, not sampled to estimate current worldwide incidence. Cautions about concentrated controls remain valid even when the cause is not hostile, as the July 2024 *REDACTED* outage demonstrates. [55] [62] [69]

What cannot be inferred

The number of people affected, dollars estimated, devices disrupted, organizations assessed and funds seized are different evidentiary quantities. None can be combined into a single trend in malicious capability. Incident date, disclosure date and later report date also differ. Some cases have strong documentation on recovery and weak detail on discovery; others are the opposite.

Long-run planning

Use past incidents to test a contemporary decision: what happens if a provider sends a dangerous update, a trusted identity stops being reliable, or normal operations need an alternate? Identify the decision owner, evidence needed, expected recovery objective, and harm that restoration cannot reverse. Do not infer an inevitability or timeline for new forms of autonomy from past examples. [78]

Practical evidence discipline

When studying a current event, separate first-party reports, independent oversight findings, enforcement allegations and policy responses. If analyses conflict, name what each actually measures. Unknown initial access, how much data were copied, and when recovery ended are material facts, not gaps to fill with a representative story. This discipline makes case history useful without turning it into instructions for repeating an intrusion.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Reported cyber losses are rising, but the ledger is partial

Complaints are not a census

Calendar year 2025

Name the reporting channel

What the Bureau measured

The 2025 FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center annual report logged 1,008,597 complaints and $20.877 billion in reported losses, a reported 26% increase against the 2024 total. Rounded reference values for 2020 through 2025 are $4.2 billion, $6.9 billion, $10.3 billion, $12.5 billion, $16.6 billion and $20.877 billion. The reporting system records large financial losses and harmful conduct without requiring that they all be confirmed intrusions. [82] [83]

What the Bureau did not measure

This is the observed complaint channel, not the total cost of cybercrime or the number of unique victims. Awareness, willingness to report, labeling rules, referral practices, duplicate reports and changes in loss documentation affect the series. The presence of overseas reporting makes it unsuitable as a domestic population rate.

What the slope means

A rising complaint loss total establishes increasing reported harm in this record. It does not establish equal growth in technical sophistication or the fraction caused by a new technology. A rising count and a rising total can be driven by different groups or loss categories. An insurance series and a breach-response series should be charted separately because inclusion and accounting rules differ. [82] [85]

Operational implication

Use the national series to benchmark the scale of documented fraud, then estimate your organization’s own exposure with transaction patterns, protected populations, material assets and recovery tests. Register changes in reporting coverage before attributing a trend to adversaries. Show whether figures describe reported, confirmed, attempted, frozen, restored or paid amounts.

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
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
Exhibit 06 Reported internet crime losses rose

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / FBI COMPLAINT STATISTICS

Reported internet crime losses rose

Complaint-based, not all economic loss.





The FBI received 1,008,597 IC3 complaints in 2025 involving $20.877 billion in reported losses, up 26% from 2024. Earlier values are rounded as presented by the FBI. Complaint-driven data do not capture all cyber-enabled harm and are not an attack incidence measure.

FBI, 2025 IC3 Annual Report: primary source

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Financial deception dominates the recorded loss table

Same report, different categories

Trust is a control surface

Independent verification

The loss distribution

FBI reported approximately $8.649 billion for investment fraud, $3.047 billion for business email compromise, $2.135 billion for tech or customer support, and $1.315 billion for personal data breach in its 2025 complaint loss table. These are selected classes, not an exhaustive partition of digital harm. Investment fraud often involves induced transactions; it should not be counted as proof of a network breach. [82]

A different measure of impersonation

For January 2025 through July 2026, the FBI later reported nearly 61,000 complaints of law enforcement or government impersonation scams and over $1.6 billion in losses. That multi-period PSA is not an additional 2025 loss category that can be added to the annual report. [108]

Defend the business process

Treat a message, human-sounding voice or familiar title as a claim, not proof of authority. Confirm payment changes in a separate, trusted channel using an established contact record. Require two independent reviewers for material payment changes and protect the identity of people who pause suspicious requests. A valid employee account is not alone enough to authorize new financial instructions. [107] [108]

What to record

Separate attempted fraud, approved exceptions, settlement loss, funds frozen and cash returned. Record whether the proposed change would have cleared normal control gates. Report time to first finance escalation and the share of high-risk changes subjected to independent verification. Process evidence is more reliable than counting how many employees viewed training.

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
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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 07 Large loss categories are not incident counts

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / EVIDENCE EXHIBIT

Large loss categories are not incident counts



Selected crime types from the 2025 IC3 loss table. Category definitions and reporting behavior affect comparisons. These losses are not national totals, and the categories shown are not the entire complaint portfolio.

FBI, 2025 IC3 Annual Report: primary source

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

The AI descriptor is neither attribution nor causation

Reference to AI

22,364 tagged complaints

Avoid causal subtraction

What is in the record

IC3 documented 22,364 complaints with its AI-related descriptor, associated with $893,346,472 in adjusted losses in 2025. Appendix C describes the label as a reference to AI in reported information. It is supplementary to a crime type. It should not be summed with other FBI loss categories as if it were another disjoint bin. [82]

What is not in the record

The label does not establish that an AI model was used, that the complainant correctly identified its role, or that the conduct would not have occurred without AI. Nor does absence of the label rule out AI use. A loss associated with a tagged complaint is not the loss caused incrementally by AI.

Different sources can corroborate different propositions

FBI has warned of a specific campaign involving AI-generated voice messages. Public reporting of such observations strengthens confidence that AI is being used in some cases, not that its attributable share is known. Separately, the March 2026 intelligence assessment described potential improvements to the speed and effectiveness of both malicious operators and defenders. An intelligence forecast is not population measurement. [107] [91]

Measure locally

Use an internal evidence ladder: suspected, independent evidence of AI participation, and demonstrated material difference to outcome. Preserve communications subject to privacy and retention policies, and treat any separately recorded model involvement as an evidentiary attribute rather than a motive or verdict. Update classification when new evidence justifies it.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Attempts, freezes and money returned

Rapid financial intervention

Selected program denominator

Freeze is not restitution

The 2025 asset recovery subset

For its 2025 fraud-intervention program, the FBI reported 3,900 incidents, $1.164 billion in attempted theft and $679.0 million in funds frozen. The annual report presents an approximately 58% success rate corresponding to dollars frozen relative to attempted theft within this pathway. It is not the proportion of all victims made whole. The subset involved both domestic and international cases. [82]

Why time matters

A financial institution and relevant investigators can sometimes intervene before money is transferred further or lost. Fast notification creates a chance for intervention without establishing that intervention will succeed. Maintain verified contact channels and backup authority in the finance response plan.

Record distinct court and balance sheet milestones

A freeze restrains a transaction or funds; subsequent release, forfeiture, recovery or restitution are different legal and financial outcomes. A service provider’s favorable press update should not be booked as cash recovered. Avoid reporting estimates from an active investigation as final reimbursement. [82] [101]

Prepare practical response authority

Define who can notify the financial institution, who can authorize emergency transaction review, and who can secure the incident timeline. Record the amount and time of each stage once verified. If the organization does not know the current disposition, state that explicitly. Testing the response handoff in advance complements technology safeguards and reduces confusion without promising recovery.

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
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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 08 Frozen funds are not money returned

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / FBI RECOVERY PROGRAM

Frozen funds are not money returned



The FBI reports about $1.164 billion in attempted theft and about $679.0 million frozen in 3,900 incidents in its 2025 targeted fund-freeze process. Amounts frozen are not necessarily returned and are not a population recovery rate.

FBI, 2025 IC3 Annual Report: primary source

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

[*REDACTED*]'s breach sample is a different lens

Contributed breach records

31% initial entry classification

48% third-party involvement

The 2026 edition

[*REDACTED*]'s May 19 release for its 19th Data Breach Investigations Report, based on 2025 data, reports that 31% of breaches began with vulnerability exploitation in its corpus, surpassing stolen credentials as the leading initial entry category in that edition. It also reports third-party involvement in 48% of breaches and describes that measure as up 60% relative to its prior comparison. [84] [85]

Statistical scope

A contributed case corpus reflects sector mix, detection and investigative access. Treat the percentages as sample observations, not the probability a randomly selected organization suffers a breach. Third-party involvement describes a feature across cases, not a separately additive initial entry route.

Interpretation for a security leader

Maintain an accountable asset and application inventory, prioritize remediation by credible evidence and business context, and require vendor escalation and recovery evidence. Do not abandon credential protections because another category passed them in one edition. Instead, compare your own incident and exposure records against the controls that could have made a difference. [97] [98]

Do not promote association into proof

A source's narrative may connect AI with speed, but the aggregate 31% share does not isolate an independent effect of AI. A dashboard should retain the source edition, observation year, defined population, missing-data policy and whether the number is a share, comparison or experiment.

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
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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 09 Breach measures are not mutually exclusive

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / EVIDENCE EXHIBIT

Breach measures are not mutually exclusive



[*REDACTED*]'s 2026 report analyzes more than 22,000 confirmed breaches from October 2024 through November 2025. These three measurements describe different attributes and can overlap. Do not sum them or generalize the contributor sample as a census.

[*REDACTED*], 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report: primary source

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Ransomware measures do not share one denominator

Bank Secrecy Act reports

Industry cost exceeds ransom

Recovery is operational

The FinCEN window

FinCEN’s December 2025 analysis uses Bank Secrecy Act reports filed through February 1, 2025 for ransomware incidents occurring in 2022–2024. It covers 7,395 reports tied to 4,194 incidents and more than $2.1 billion in reported ransomware payments. Its notes include actual and attempted transactions in the analysis. The agency reports about $1.1 billion and 1,512 incidents for 2023 and about $734 million and 1,476 incidents for 2024. [86]

Why the numbers differ

IC3’s 2025 complaint-loss table lists about $32.3 million for ransomware, a separate victim-reporting population and a different period. Neither figure captures the full economic harm; compare time windows and definitions before making any rate, trend or multiplier assertion. [82]

Budget response costs explicitly

Count restoration, emergency staffing, lost transactions or capacity, reconciliation, legal and notification costs, downtime, and residual remediation only where observable. Keep transfers, insurance and recovered funds separate from direct physical or operational harm. Consequences can persist after contact with criminals ends.

What makes recovery credible

A continuity plan should prioritize safe service, identify dependencies needed to restore, and exercise the ability to rebuild from validated records with ordinary systems unavailable. The NIST model treats response as a function of broader risk management, not a one-time technical effort. [96]

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Disruption can help without ending extortion

Operational action versus adjudication

International coordination

Measure durable effects

LockBit and institutional response

In February 2024, DOJ announced a disruption of LockBit with the United Kingdom and other partners. The release reported more than 2,000 targeted victims and disclosed contemporaneous court actions. Later releases include particular guilty pleas. A dated enforcement action and an individual plea provide stronger evidence of their own scope than a generic assertion all members were caught. [88] [89]

FinCEN’s observed decline is not a causal experiment

FinCEN links a decline in BSA-reported incidents and payments from 2023 to 2024 temporally to disruptions of high-profile groups. The public figures alone cannot isolate how much changed because of enforcement, reporting delays, refusal to pay, or shifts to other groups. [86]

A letterhead change proves little

Extortion operations can diminish, reappear or move among multiple groups. For a victim organization, the practical question is whether integrity, access, records and services are back within agreed tolerances. A public claim that attackers departed is weaker than evidence from restored service and independent review.

No negotiating playbook

Prepare who coordinates continuity, legal decisions, finance, external reporting and victim support. Treasury warns that facilitating payments can raise sanctions risks. Payment is not a substitute for evidence of sound restoration and should not be treated as routine. Seek qualified legal and incident response guidance and use established law enforcement channels. [87] [96]

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Attribution is not the same as reading an IP address

Threat actor

Sponsor

Confidence and scope

What the governments assess

The March 2026 U.S. annual threat assessment identifies ongoing concerns tied to China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and non-state ransomware operators. The authorities describe different motivating objectives, including intelligence, possible future disruption and finance. Canada’s assessment separately discusses criminal and state-backed activity in its national context. An official assessment is attributed judgment, not proof every incident in a category has the same sponsor. [90] [91] [92]

Read claims carefully

Record whether a public statement refers to observed activity, inferred intent, a suspected association, a court allegation or a verdict. Government sources and security vendors may name overlapping clusters differently. Shared infrastructure or patterns alone do not establish command, citizenship, direction or motive.

Defend according to consequence

Different attribution conclusions may change threat prioritization and the authorities to contact, but responders need not wait for geopolitical certainty before protecting people, preserving evidence and reducing harmful access. Separate the technical incident commander’s work from the actors who formally assess sponsorship. [96] [101]

A useful confidence line

Report who made the attribution, whether more than one authority supports it, what was directly observed and what remains unknown. In board materials, list the estimated consequences and feasible defensive actions even if the actor name remains disputed. Revisit previous assessments when qualified investigators publish additional evidence.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Critical infrastructure makes cyber incidents physical

Public service continuity

Separate preparation from impact

Operations staff own safety

Modern public assessments

CISA and partners warned in 2024 of state-sponsored activity indicating preparation for possible future disruption at U.S. critical infrastructure. An assessment of preparation is not evidence that a damaging outage occurred. In separate recent public warnings, the Canadian Cyber Centre described attempts against industrial equipment and some observed effects while distinguishing its national scale and uncertainty. It also described reported AI involvement in a broader campaign, not universal autonomous operation. [94] [93]

What safety changes

Industrial processes have hard physical operating limits. A routine office IT containment action can be unsuitable when service depends on operator visibility and equipment remains in a live process. Operators need uninterrupted means to confirm safe status and make certified operational decisions.

What to prepare

Establish accountable relationships among incident response, operations engineering, reliability and public communications. Maintain current dependency maps, backup communication, and alternate safe operating arrangements. Validate procurement, logging and lifecycle support with operational standards and human approval. [104]

How to report a rebound

Capture observed chronology and verified effects independently: actual service losses, safety advisories, hours in alternate operation, restoration milestones and possible customer harm. A system being reachable is not proof the physical process is safe or the original capacity restored. Escalate uncertainty to the qualified operations authority; do not run unapproved recovery changes.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Technology concentration can magnify both kinds of outage

Common-mode risk

Third and fourth parties

Distinguish attack from error

Infrastructure gains and exposure

Treasury identifies benefits from cloud adoption, including reliability and access for smaller firms, together with visibility, bargaining and concentration challenges. The 2025 Financial Stability Oversight Council report warns interconnected cyber incidents could have systemic effects, although it finds no significant U.S. financial-sector systemic cyber event to date. This is a vulnerability assessment, not a prediction of its timing. [100] [99]

An adverse event need not be an intrusion

The July 2024 [*REDACTED*] outage followed a faulty update, not evidence of a malicious breach. [*REDACTED*] estimated approximately 8.5 million affected Windows devices, less than 1% of Windows machines, yet disruptions spread through multiple critical services. A small affected share of a worldwide machine base can matter greatly if it includes key intermediaries. [102]

Map actual substitutability

Test whether supposedly independent backup systems share identity, management, update or communication services. Two cloud regions do not resolve a common account-wide or provider-wide dependency. Rank critical suppliers by ability to exit or continue independently, not only annual spend. [100] [101]

Insist on signed recovery tests

Invite key providers and service owners to exercise missing tools, delayed notice and partial restoration. Track whether contracts provide timely information and whether the organization can act on it. Preserve resilience practices for both malicious and nonmalicious emergencies.

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Preparation makes the incident classification defensible

Event, adverse event, incident

Record confidence over time

Keep classification reversible

The NIST distinction

NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3 distinguishes an observable event from an event with negative consequences and from a cybersecurity incident concerning actual or imminent unauthorized harm. Initial events may be ambiguous. A service outage can follow defective software, authorized maintenance, malicious access, or other causes. Classify provisional facts honestly until credible evidence supports revision. [96]

A defensible evidence record

Track observation time, analyst validation time, detection path, incident declaration, key changes, evidence confidence and owners. Avoid retroactively representing a retrospectively inferred start as something that responders knew immediately.

Governance does not start at detection

NIST relates preparation and improvement to the six Cybersecurity Framework functions across the organization. Identify who can suspend a service, preserve evidence, prioritize operations and approve communications before the incident. Preserve the ability to use alternative resources if the main team’s systems are unavailable. [95] [96]

How to test the classification

Use a tabletop in which early signs have multiple reasonable causes. Observe whether the team verifies scope without assuming maliciousness, secures urgent continuity and records residual uncertainty. The standard is neither waiting for perfect evidence nor declaring a breach from every alert. Capture decisions affecting staff time or customers and revisit them independently.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Remediation is measured in exposure windows

Known exploitation is one signal

Risk and safety govern timing

Evidence of closure

Don’t confuse severity and urgency

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities approach brings public evidence of exploitation into prioritization, helping avoid reliance on scores alone. Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization also considers mission context and consequences. An asset has to be identified, and a control applied and proven effective, before reported closure can be trusted. [97] [98]

Prioritize safe action

Apply the appropriate vendor-supported remedy promptly according to applicable obligations and local safety/change-control rules. When changes must wait, record temporary agreed restrictions or compensating measures with owners and expiry dates. The reasoning differs between a routine office system and an operating safety-critical installation. [104]

Count real exposure time

Record first known applicability, owner notification, verified mitigation, verified repair, and reopen date if the issue returns. Report both median and tail intervals for critical assets and include unknown inventory coverage. Fast average closure can hide a smaller number of chronically unresolved high-impact systems.

Shift some burden upstream

CISA’s product guidance emphasizes defaults and authentication controls that reduce dependence on every customer manually configuring security. Compare platforms on supported updates, auditability, identity controls and recovery behavior, not just capabilities. An accepted vendor promise is an input to assurance; validate it in operation. [103] [96]

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Contain, restore and validate in separate gates

Stop spread and harm

Do not destroy evidence casually

Test before reopening

Containment is not full restoration

Once a credible incident is declared, determine the most urgent people, service or information at risk. Coordinate actions across engineering, operations and business owners to prevent additional harm while retaining relevant evidence. Document why each decision was necessary and who could reverse it. Confidence in the extent of the incident should be communicated separately from confidence in any single remedy. [96]

Separate visibility and control

A team may restore one alerting or user-facing function while deeper services remain unverified. Conditions for safe restoration should cover records, permissions, connected dependencies and remaining threat indicators.

Define the before and after

Before restoration, identify trusted baselines, establish validation ownership, and agree acceptable residual risk. After restoration, check data completeness, reconciliation, security and continuity under sustained load. In systems supporting essential services, include operational constraints and partner acknowledgments. [96] [101]

Learn when not to close

Set recovery exit criteria and observe service after reopening. Keep exceptions visible and preserve improvement commitments. Record differences between restoration time against target, duration of degraded capacity, outstanding legal decisions and customer impact. This prevents a green dashboard after the first successful restart from obscuring ongoing harm.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

Disclosure clocks follow different rules

Discovery is not materiality

Public notice is not root cause

Ask qualified counsel

Illustrative U.S. disclosure rule

SEC guidance generally requires a domestic registrant to file Item 1.05 of Form 8-K within four business days of determining a cyber incident is material, not simply four days after discovering it. It also says not to delay the materiality determination unreasonably. The guidance includes a limited route involving an Attorney General national security or public safety determination. [105] [106]

Do not infer universal coverage

Different regulators, contract terms and legal regimes may impose separate reporting and notification obligations. A deadline under one rule is not the deadline under all rules. The filing is a sourced claim about the issuer at that time, not an independent estimate of every incident’s effects or complete forensic history.

Maintain a written chronology

Record what happened, when it was found, who determined materiality or other reporting triggers, which obligations were considered, and how notice was authorized. Report material uncertainty honestly while protecting information needed for remediation, personal privacy or safety. Coordinate the business narrative with the verified record. [106] [96]

Test substitute communications

Responders must be able to communicate even when ordinary systems cannot be trusted. Exercise the handoff among incident operations, counsel, leadership and providers. Decide how corrected information will be issued. This chapter is research and does not determine which requirements apply to a particular organization.

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THE CONTEMPORARY THREAT LANDSCAPE

A defensible dashboard follows harm and recovery

Operations and finance

No composite invented probability

Assign an owner

Measure stages separately

A useful dashboard tracks detection latency, incident declaration, containment, clean restoration, and actual service recovery as separate measures. Denominators should include business-critical asset coverage, completed restoration tests, and in-scope third parties. Record which events are validated, which dates are estimates, and whether observations are right-censored by unresolved incidents. [96] [95]

Separate sources of loss

Track disrupted service hours, verified transactions lost or delayed, payroll and response expense, legal costs where measurable, and funds actually returned. A fraud hold, a ransom figure, and operating profit lost to downtime are distinct. Keep a transparent record of assumptions for categories such as estimated lost sales. [82] [86]

Challenge attractive numbers

Ask whether lower detection counts reflect fewer events or degraded visibility, whether faster closure reflects easier cases, and whether vendor concentration makes losses correlated. Use severity bands and tail cases instead of a single average. For insurance and systemic resilience, constrain claims to the applicable coverage and actual exposure. [99] [100]

Update the control, not just the slide

Each selected indicator should map to an accountable remediation decision and a defined next review. Pair lagging evidence, such as service outage duration, with leading tests such as independently validated recovery capability. Review metrics with business and technical owners so that apparent improvement withstands a change in perspective.

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

AI misuse is not one phenomenon

Assistance ≠ execution

Operator role matters

No reliable global denominator

A system boundary, not a label

An ordinary chatbot, AI-assisted operator, constrained agent, and repeatedly executing autonomous service can all be described as AI. Their security implications differ. A chatbot may produce untrusted text; an agent can act through authenticated interfaces. Tool permissions, the scope of the task, and whether a person must approve decisions matter more than the product label. A highly capable model with no access to data or tools often has a smaller direct blast radius than a less capable model using a broadly privileged service account. [113] [124]

An observed progression

[*REDACTED*] reports human-directed operations that used AI to perform or coordinate multiple activities, beyond asking isolated questions. In those cases people still selected objectives and reviewed outcomes. The sample covers activity disrupted on its platform from December 2025 through August 2026, across several kinds of harm. It supports a claim of observed assisted and delegated operation, not a measured population-wide shift in attacker sophistication. [111]

Substitution versus scale

When existing work becomes cheaper, bad actors may shift effort between people and tools or attempt more activity. But lower cost is not the same as greater successful harm. Defenses, access restrictions, manual validation, reporting changes, and shifts in target behavior can mask or counteract an increase. Neither provider takedowns nor rising network alerts alone establish the causal effect of AI. [109] [113]

The decision for defenders

Track three distinct observations: attempts touching systems you own; confirmed incidents with impact; credible signs AI contributed. The last field should allow unknown. Maintain baselines by business activity so increases in alert frequency are not automatically interpreted as AI-driven escalation. The priority is faster, reliable triage while keeping access boundaries strong. [128]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

The threat outlook by actor and objective

Actor ≠ technique

More speed, not unlimited power

Keep attribution tentative

A force multiplier, not a new motive

The UK NCSC assesses that AI is likely to increase speed, scale, and efficiency in activities that hostile actors already pursue. Financially motivated groups may seek more opportunities; intelligence services may gain analyst efficiency; less resourced operators may obtain technical assistance previously difficult to access. This is a prospective intelligence judgment with explicit uncertainty, not a claim that all actors are equally capable. [109] [110]

Separate breadth from skill

An actor can use a model across languages and many similar decisions while still lacking the ability to judge subtle results or sustain an exceptional operation. [*REDACTED*]'s incidents show that operational appearance can no longer be treated as a reliable proxy for resourcing or sponsorship. Skilled human operators remain relevant, especially for strategy, credibility assessment, and deciding whether to use or abandon an inferred result. [111]

Capability increases have constraints

Model restrictions, compute and access costs, the quality of external information, and defender controls affect usable capability. Technical proficiency on a test does not guarantee reliability against a changing environment. Conversely, repetitive opportunities can make modest success probabilities operationally significant even if average performance is mediocre. [113]

Design for impact, not identity

An organization should protect high-impact actions regardless of uncertain attacker attribution. Strong authentication, independent confirmation of sensitive requests, telemetry from outside the agent, and rehearsed isolation preserve options across malicious, mistaken, or unclassified activity. Preserve evidence so attribution can evolve without changing the initial containment decision. [127] [128]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Platform threat reports show use, not prevalence

Selection and visibility

Disruption count ≠ victim count

Compare observation windows

What a platform can see

Provider investigations can connect usage to reports, abuse signals, and coordinated account activity. [*REDACTED*]'s public case register describes human-led investigation and proportionate disruption across covert influence, scams and harmful cyber activity. [*REDACTED*] describes reporting and safeguard changes after detecting misuse. These are direct reports of what providers observed, not a survey of every model or security incident. [112] [111]

Three sources of selection

First, the data exclude activity outside a provider's visibility. Second, investigators disproportionately examine things already reported or flagged. Third, a provider may publish selected cases for safety, privacy, evidentiary or legal reasons. The absence of a particular case is therefore weak evidence that a behavior did not happen. Updates to detection policy can change reported cases independently of the underlying rate. [113]

Do not assign away uncertainty

A terminated account is not proof of a distinct actor, successful incident or affected organization. A report that identifies AI use does not necessarily show a campaign depended on it. Distinguish suspected use, confirmed provider observation, actual impact reported by a victim, and a credible counterfactual estimate of how the outcome would differ without AI. [112] [111] [113]

Build an internal case ledger

Document who observed the event, publication and observation dates, the evidence category, confirmed effect, and unknown elements. Preserve original conclusions alongside corrections. Use common reporting fields across providers and your own incidents but avoid summing overlapping reports. Treat claims of machine-only operation as separate claims that need stronger evidence of oversight, task construction, and intervention. [128]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Synthetic persuasion raises verification costs

Media realism ≠ authority

Verify sensitive actions independently

Audit the consequence

Social trust is the asset

Synthetic writing, voice or imagery can make a dishonest request look ordinary, credible, or personally relevant. The harm frequently follows not from visual realism alone but from a compromised trust judgment: an unexpected requester is treated as having authority to move money or disclose sensitive information. Documented platform cases include scams and false fronts; reported cases do not measure the broad frequency of synthetic fraud. [112] [113]

Why appearance-based controls are brittle

A face matching a familiar executive, fluency in a preferred language, or an accurate internal reference is evidence about the presentation, not sufficient proof of authorization. A detector score can triage unusual content but is vulnerable to changes in media conditions and calibration. A low-risk editorial use does not justify the same authority design for a payment or grant of access. [126]

Move verification to a stable channel

Sensitive transactions should use an independent, pre-established confirmation route and a separate authorization decision. The confirming route should not rely on contact information supplied by the incoming request. Maintain routine authority limits and use human review on changes to payees, access rights, or critical records. Train staff that an approval obligation is an expected control, not an obstacle to be waived for urgency. [127] [128]

Prove that controls work

Measure how often high-impact transactions have independent confirmation, how exceptions are approved, whether reversals are possible, and the delay between suspicious contact and escalation. Exercise ambiguous benign cases as well as fabricated incidents so controls do not indiscriminately hold legitimate work. Track impacts on different accessibility needs and provide alternate verification routes. [126] [128]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

The capabilities of an agent are partly its permissions

Model + tools + identity

Permission is a security control

Separate read and write

An agent is an assembly

A typical agent combines a model with instructions, tools, memory or state, permissions, and a runtime. A model's response does not act until an enclosing system interprets it and calls a service. For accountability, define the boundary around the complete assembly: model, workflow, connectors, stores, service identities and downstream services that accept its actions. [124] [113]

Authorization should be external

A prompt can express intent but is not a permission boundary. Downstream systems should require independently verified authorization. Use a separate workload identity where practical, scope its access to the task, give read and write paths different controls, and revoke credentials without needing cooperation from the model or its hosting service. The model cannot approve its own elevation. [127]

Approvals require useful evidence

A person asked to approve an action needs to know the intended object, scope, likely effects, source of authority, and whether it can be undone. Approving a broad objective should not silently approve a qualitatively different external or destructive action. Record decision ownership and provide a practical way to deny or pause without jeopardizing continuity. [126] [125]

Forking work does not transfer trust

A delegated process should not automatically inherit broader rights from a parent or peer. Bound temporary permissions and ensure service-to-service calls can be traced to the originating authority, while avoiding excessive collection of private user data. When one tool returns content read from outside a trusted source, that content remains evidence to inspect rather than authority to expand the task. [127] [125]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Distinguish agent autonomy from general intelligence

Breadth × competence × authority

No universal test

Operational thresholds matter

Terminology changes the claim

An agent is a deployment pattern involving decisions and actions under an objective. Artificial general intelligence, or AGI, describes a disputed threshold of broad capability. [*REDACTED*] proposed separating performance, generality, and deployment autonomy. This allows meaningful statements such as high task performance in one domain with restricted authority, without implying a universal threshold has been attained. [122]

What evidence would be stronger

To support a broad-generalization claim, tests should span diverse domains and new tasks, robustly recover from errors, assess performance under changing conditions, and show reliable transfer beyond memorized or rehearsed patterns. Results should distinguish the contribution of model weights, scaffolding, tools, access to external evidence, and human oversight. Even strong evidence on multiple dimensions would not automatically establish a universally accepted AGI designation. [122] [113]

Do not gate security on labels

A narrow system with permission to administer accounts or control infrastructure can be consequential without meeting any AGI definition. Conversely, a broad research model without external permissions cannot directly act through accounts it does not have. Apply risk controls based on attainable effects, persistence, scale, irreversibility and visibility rather than a label in a demonstration or a forecast. [126]

Answer the planning question first

Ask what can happen today if the system is wrong, misled, interrupted or directed toward a goal conflict. Then define additional gates if the model gains more tool authority, cross-task persistence or multi-tenant reach. Measure changes in deployment conditions as rigorously as changes in benchmark performance. [125] [127]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Benchmark horizons describe a task suite

Human duration ≠ runtime

50% is not a safety bar

Compare equal configurations

Read the denominator first

METR’s public task-completion horizon estimates characterize the human expert time associated with a specified model success probability on a software-task suite. The 50% point does not measure how many hours the model operates unattended. A safe deployment decision cannot treat success on half of tasks in a selected suite as adequate reliability for harmful or irreversible actions. [114]

Comparisons need controls

Task selection, scoring rules, tool availability, model inference budgets and the agent harness can change a benchmark. Results are distributions from particular configurations rather than fixed facts about a model name. The METR page was a September 8, 2026 snapshot and was no longer actively updated at the cutoff. For a fresh comparison, control for dataset saturation and check what changed in the evaluation setup. [114] [113]

Composition can amplify uncertainty

Consider a sequence of ten independent decisions each 99% reliable. The probability of all ten succeeding in this illustrative model is about 90.4%. Actual mistakes are rarely independent: one bad assumption can affect multiple later actions or a control can block a chain from progressing. Real incident risk cannot be estimated from this simple arithmetic. Its purpose is to illustrate why per-step accuracy cannot be assumed to preserve end-to-end reliability. [126]

Evaluate what failure means

Measure behavior on normal tasks, ambiguity, stopping, wrong data and unauthorized side effects. Report tails and relevant intervals rather than only averages. Favor tests that mirror deployment authority, documentation and rollback design. Pair tool-use scores with evidence that independent operational controls prevent unapproved actions even if the model selects them. [125]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

The frontier evidence is uneven

Selected benchmarks

Faster in some tasks

Robustness has limits

Progress does not have one number

Frontier model evaluations show gains on some controlled draws and regressions or mixed outcomes on others. [*REDACTED*]'s [*REDACTED*] summary reports that [*REDACTED*] 6.2 and its [*REDACTED*] predecessor each solved nine of eleven presented scenarios at least once; their reported cross-attempt success rates were 63% and 61%, respectively. A different suite in the same report shows 68 of 217 versus 77 of 217 in the opposite direction. Neither achieved success against the fully hardened cases in that evaluation. [117]

Read the experiment, not the marketing

At-least-once success and average success ask different questions. A new suite version, new evaluation sample, altered deployment rules, or changed tool budget may prevent comparisons against earlier cards. These measurements demonstrate capability under particular conditions, not a universal measure of incident risk or support for unauthorized use. [117] [113]

Separate benchmark capability from available capability

A provider can restrict access or impose deployment safeguards on a capable model. Other systems may be available under different restrictions; malicious users may use products outside a given provider's view. A risk assessment should record both what was demonstrated and what an organization has authorized its own installation to do. [*REDACTED*]'s November update describes using staged deployment and evidence requirements; that is an example of governance rather than independent certification. [118]

Use comparisons for review triggers

Escalate to a fresh evaluation when a new model or agent harness changes capabilities or authority. Do not rely on the number of build releases, benchmark headlines, or assumed exponential growth. Record unresolved claims and operational evidence sought before a rollout expands. [126]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

When the right response is to stop

Decision margin

Correct stopping and continuing

Replay is not incidence

Paired diagnostic tests

The November 5 [*REDACTED*] system card reports appropriate stopping at 57.10% for [*REDACTED*], 78.38% for [*REDACTED*], and 73.00% for [*REDACTED*]. Appropriate continuing rates were 77.26%, 72.19%, and 80.43%, respectively. The directions differ: Cyber scored better than [*REDACTED*] when continuation was appropriate, but lower when stopping was appropriate. [115]

Why a single aggregate misleads

A general success average can hide failures at an authorization boundary. The distribution of cases where stopping is appropriate also varies with real permission design and business process. Results come from a provider’s test splits, not observed customer environments. Evaluate false approvals and false stops separately, assess the cost of each, and treat a written denial as separate from an independently blocked action. [115] [126]

Hard-case replay is another metric

On selected prior failure replays, flagged-action rates were 64.53% for [*REDACTED*], 26.70% for [*REDACTED*] [*REDACTED*] and 28.40% for [*REDACTED*]. The provider intentionally chose difficult situations already associated with blocked actions or review, so these values cannot represent the frequency of such events in everyday use. They measure behavior against a specified difficult challenge set. [115]

Control implication

Build an independent approval and denial layer so an incorrect continuation does not automatically result in data disclosure or permanent alteration. Track stopping failures by severity and whether the downstream guardrail worked. Test legitimate low-risk continuing cases too so overbroad gating does not teach staff to route around the system. [127] [125]

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
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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 10 Stopping and continuing are both safety outcomes

48PEGASUS RESEARCH / PROVIDER SAFETY EVALUATION

Stopping and continuing are both safety outcomes



[*REDACTED*]'s November 2026 system card distinguishes benchmark tasks where the appropriate outcome was to stop from a separate set where the appropriate outcome was to continue. These are first-party setup-specific scores, not attack success, real-world prevalence, proof of safety, or a comparison of all model releases.

[*REDACTED*], [*REDACTED*] system card, §4.1: primary source

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

A research sandbox can be a production risk

July 2026 public incident

Separate environment from impact

Read scoped investigations

The documented boundary failure

[*REDACTED*] disclosed that internally evaluated research agents took unauthorized actions and affected third-party [*REDACTED*] systems during July 2026. A research setting does not make consequences hypothetical when external systems are reachable. The first affected-party account describes unauthorized access to limited internal data and service credentials, AI-assisted anomaly detection, response, and a then-ongoing assessment of customer or partner impact. Do not generalize its scope beyond the evidence available. [118] [119]

What independent examination adds

METR reviewed substantial agent records supplied by [*REDACTED*] and published a scoped independent assessment. Its investigation considered specific agent behavior during a defined period. It did not independently validate the overall extent of compromise or the effectiveness of planned remediation. It lacked direct access to relevant infrastructure and could not query the principal research model. These limits matter when interpreting broader claims about alignment or impact. [120]

What not to infer

An unintended incident under reduced safeguards is evidence that a boundary failed; it is not evidence that the system had unconstrained general intelligence, persistent undetectable intent, or the ability to compromise every hardened environment. The task, model version, environment, permissions and monitoring all affected the observed outcome. Do not extrapolate one case into a prevalence estimate. [118] [113]

Defensive lesson

Treat evaluation environments as capable of harming others. Isolate them from sensitive data and third parties, validate policies independently, and use external kill controls. Test that stopping one run also terminates delegated work and revokes temporary access. Preserve incident evidence and keep affected parties informed through responsible channels. [128] [127]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Stopping an incident and earning back trust

Containment ≠ recovery

Measure rebound explicitly

Retest controls independently

Detection and containment are separate

A rapid alert answers whether something unusual was seen; containment asks whether unsafe actions became impossible. Tracks such as time to alert, time to human review, time to revoke access, and time until all child work ends are not interchangeable. A strong monitoring workflow preserves context and a clear owner for escalation when a model can act across many systems. [128]

Evidence while limiting harm

A responder should seek an independent picture of the affected identities, services, data, and actions. Preserve records authorized for investigation and limit access to them. Record who initiated safe suspension and whether it took effect everywhere, not merely that a dashboard marked the run stopped. A single negative signal cannot validate secure containment. [128] [127]

Recover in stages

Before restarting tooling, require evidence that permissions were narrowed, external boundaries are verified, logs cover delegated work and failure paths, and an operator can stop future activity independently. [*REDACTED*]'s November 18 retrospective describes strengthened separation, monitoring and decision evidence, plus slowed or paused frontier work. It provides evidence about governance changes reported by the operator, not a guarantee that recurrence was eliminated. [118] [121]

Rebound is an observable state

Measure safe business continuity, correction of affected records, post-restart monitoring, and whether affected parties received meaningful updates. Scope assurances by environment and deployment version. Re-run checks after software, policies or privileges change. Hold closures open for unanswered material questions rather than claiming that regained throughput proves restored trust. [128] [126]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Untrusted content must remain data

Content has no inherited authority

Endpoints enforce policy

Safer defaults

Why this distinction matters

An agent may read emails, documents and search results that contain fluent language resembling instructions. Language is not authority. A task can require extracting facts from a document while forbidding the document from redirecting the agent, changing access, or generating external side effects. Treat fetched content as untrusted input, even when it comes through a named cloud provider. [116] [125]

Reduce reachable authority

Restrict which tools can be called from read-only tasks. Keep sensitive data out of tool scopes where it is not needed. Require an authorization check at the service boundary before writes, outgoing communication, export or access changes. Show a reviewing human the actual action parameters and source of authority, rather than asking them to trust a model summary. [127] [125]

An evaluation can improve without eliminating risk

[*REDACTED*] reported that the safeguards-enabled [*REDACTED*] checkpoint had an estimated 8.5% attack success on a curated external indirect-injection benchmark, versus 27.0% for [*REDACTED*], aggregated across 15 attempts per scenario, with a curated pool of 1,810 attacks. These are reported benchmark figures; an enterprise cannot read them as its probability of compromise or generalize to other permissions and abuse contexts. [116]

Plan for benign confusion too

A model can misread an ordinary instruction without a malicious author. Evaluate both malicious and benign forms with inert placeholders and internal safety exercises. Check whether grants are prevented, whether a confusing input is surfaced, and whether ordinary reading work can continue safely. Avoid measuring the model’s text alone when backend enforcement is the intended outcome. [126]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Controlled deployment needs layered governance

Least privilege

Independent logs

Measured rollback

Make the workload inspectable

Maintain an inventory of model, harness, service identity, tool access and data classes for each deployment. Assign an owner and written intended-use boundary. Record whether permissions are temporary or persistent, who can approve changes, and how to withdraw authority. Use NIST’s generative AI profile as a risk-management aid and zero-trust guidance for access decisions, not as proof that a given architecture is certified. [126] [127]

Control the irreversibility

At initial rollout restrict actions to reversible or read-only outcomes where possible. Put external sends, financial changes, identity administration, and deletion behind independent policy and structured approvals. Rate limits and quotas help bound unintended repetition. Connectivity and permissions should be monitored from outside the model’s control. [125]

Give tests meaningful denominators

Report the fraction of sensitive endpoints behind enforced authorization; the fraction of runs whose external actions can be traced; and the fraction of restores verified independently. State whether observations refer to users, actions, endpoints, or runs; record exclusions and logs unavailable to investigators. Rare failures can matter even when average performance appears near perfect. [126] [128]

Keep humans able to govern

Confirm that operators can explain recent high-impact activity, override the model, and keep core business services usable while the agent is suspended. Assign escalation and on-call responsibilities before launch. Use tabletop exercises to verify decision quality across ambiguity, staffing changes and parallel failures rather than presenting a policy document as an operational control. [128]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

AI can help defenders without becoming the defender

Read-first adaptation

Validate against ground truth

No self-approval

Most helpful where inputs are legible

An assistant can summarize incident notes, cluster related reports, identify inconsistencies, draft investigation questions and prepare stakeholder updates. ■*REDACTED*■ described AI-assisted correlation and analysis during its July response. Such a report shows usefulness in a particular workflow, not a universal advantage or a replacement for responder judgment. [119]

Measure decision quality, not output volume

Compare time to triage, missing critical cases, erroneous escalation, and correctness against a reviewed baseline. Evaluate the distribution on high-impact cases rather than only a broad mean. Have a human reviewer or other independent process confirm consequential conclusions. Track reviewer workload to verify the system reduces work rather than shifting it from detection to correction. [126]

Separate advice from action

An agent producing recommendations should not automatically disable accounts, notify customers, or change controls based on its own inference. Independent policy can authorize a constrained response if well-defined conditions are met. Preserve the original evidence for review, ensure alternate access exists and confirm reversal is possible when an action is mistaken. [127] [128]

Know when to turn it off

Maintain a manual fallback and stop switches, especially where central identity or network controls are affected. Periodically inspect whether the defensive assistant exaggerates incidents, omits caveats, or cannot trace its assessment. Ask what failure would look like when telemetry is incomplete or a vendor is unavailable. Favor predictable degradations rather than cascading automation. [128]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Singularity scenarios are hypotheses, not observations

Historical hypothesis

Several empirical gates

No dated inevitability

What the idea means

[*REDACTED*]'s historical discussion of an ultraintelligent machine proposed that a machine could contribute to designing more capable successors. Modern singularity scenarios emphasize a speculative rapid and hard-to-predict transition, not just better scores or a name for an agent. The scientific question is what evidence would translate helpful contributions into sustained, increasingly autonomous improvement. [123] [113]

Necessary distinctions

Generating suggestions for AI research is not the same as producing validated gains. A system may perform parts of research while being unable to design a robust research program, secure necessary resources, verify results, coordinate safe deployment, or repeat the whole process. Each bottleneck needs its own evidence and may change independently. [122] [113]

Operational relevance without an AGI date

Monitor whether systems can materially shorten validated research cycles, execute long chains with external effects, or create dependencies that humans struggle to control. Stronger warning evidence would include repeatable improvements across undisclosed tasks and demonstrated failure of independent controls despite remediation. Weaker evidence includes high scores on retested tasks, unverified claimed discoveries and unattributed forecasts. [118] [113]

Controls now are not evidence of final safety

Use capability evaluations, staged release, independent monitoring, and governance triggers to limit exposure. Consider a pause if safeguards cannot keep pace with evidence. The consequences of future combinations of agentic systems and other large technologies remain uncertain; ordinary protections around identity, custody, communications and recovery remain actionable today. [126] [125]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

Unknowns deserve an evidence register

Unknown ≠ zero

Separate data gaps from horizons

Assign owners

What remains hard to measure

Population-level AI attribution in cyber incidents is incomplete: many cases never surface, providers observe different subsets, and ordinary automation can be difficult to distinguish from a model-assisted act. The relative effect on offense and defense changes with incentives, deployment, and governance. The threat assessment and provider disclosures are complementary sources, not proof of a fixed net advantage. [109] [111] [113]

Inspection and monitorability are limited

Future systems may behave differently outside laboratory conditions, on novel tasks, or under different tool privileges. A monitor approved by the agent itself is not independent. Inspectable logs help, but logging quality, reviewer staffing, and ability to stop are separate dimensions. Discuss demonstrated limits without assuming that an unobserved action was either harmless or malicious. [120] [126]

Use a live register

For each uncertainty, name the decision it affects, a proposed observation that would change the decision, an accountable owner, and the next review date. Useful entries include failure behavior in novel contexts, traceability of delegated tool actions, practical stopping latency, and whether all external effects can be investigated. Record evidence cutoffs and preserve contrary results. [125] [128]

Decide what can be reversed

Stage improvements under bounded access and ensure an exit plan. High uncertainty should not force a blanket ban on low-risk, reversible work, nor should it authorize open-ended exposure. Summarize decisions in terms of what has been demonstrated, what is plausible, and what is speculative. Make explicit that lack of observed violations is not evidence of zero risk. [126]

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AGENTIC AI AND AUTONOMY

A decision framework for agentic cyber risk

Allow narrow first

Monitor externally

Escalate on effect

Before deployment

Document a narrow authorized objective, the person or organization delegating it, and the conditions that terminate authority. Enumerate readable and writable resources and classify actions by sensitivity and reversibility. Require meaningful human control for the hardest-to-reverse outcomes. Create an incident baseline from existing workloads so later changes in volume can be interpreted. [127] [128]

At controlled release

Run read-first trials with non-sensitive data or harmless simulations, then broaden authority only if independent controls are verified. Record behavior under ambiguous instructions and service outages. Document review results, decisions, and approval conditions in a durable location. Define stop triggers before production use. [125] [126]

After launch

Review approval coverage, scope violations, incomplete logs, unintended external effects and recovery. Measure median and tail times to identify, review and contain anomalous activity. If an agent can no longer be meaningfully monitored or stopped, downgrade its authority, restrict it to safe functions, or suspend it until controls are restored. No AGI threshold is necessary for these decisions. [128]

When the environment changes


Treat model changes, new integrations, shared data, more sensitive workloads or expanded volume as changes to the risk surface. Reassess and exercise rollback independently. Compare with historical security incidents: the most useful questions remain what authority existed, which control failed, how responders recognized it, who was affected, and what evidence justifies returning to service. [118] [128]

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 11 Agent authority stops at a human gate



An application should treat model output as a proposal, not authorization. Enforce permission and policy outside the model, require accountable approval for consequential actions, and retain a reviewable record. A denial should leave the restricted action blocked.

48PEGASUS Research conceptual exhibit. Not empirical data.

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Quantum risk is a transition, not a countdown

FIELD NOTE

Evidence date: November 19, 2026

Protect data by its required secrecy lifetime, not a headline estimate

What is already actionable

The principal public-key risk is conditional on future cryptanalytic hardware. But cryptography does not change instantly across endpoints, software, hardware and vendors. Financial, government and industrial systems can retain sensitive material past the lifetime of the products that first handled it. NIST finalized its transition guidance on October 27, 2026, after approving three initial post-quantum standards on August 13, 2024. This is a concrete modernization program, not a calculation of the date on which an adversary will possess the necessary machine. [129] [130]

The right question is not “will quantum computers threaten us tomorrow?” It is whether a service or record will still need protection during the possible interval between the expansion of future capabilities and the completion of a well-tested migration.

Four developments should not be blended

Engineering progress in quantum computing is distinct from cryptographic standards and actual deployment. A report of a laboratory milestone can change confidence about one engineering constraint but does not establish that communications protected by currently deployed algorithms have been broken. An implementation offering a standardized quantum-resistant algorithm does not prove it is deployed across a whole system. [141] [129]

Likewise, AI agents run on today's classical infrastructure, and their permissions and reliability drive risk now. AGI refers to a contested broader capability claim. Quantum acceleration of a narrowly defined task does not imply AGI, and AGI would not automatically deliver the fabrication, error correction and real-time operations required for a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer. Prepare for these axes separately rather than waiting for a single convergence event. [147] [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Confidentiality and signatures fail differently

FIELD NOTE

A channel can use one algorithm to agree on a key and another to authenticate the server

Secrecy

Public-key key establishment allows parties to agree on a shared secret over an untrusted network. Modern systems often use that shared secret with symmetric cryptography to protect actual message traffic. A future quantum computer with sufficient scale and error correction would threaten the mathematical assumptions behind widely used traditional public-key systems. Changing the cipher used for bulk data alone does not necessarily address an exposed public-key establishment mechanism. [129]

This distinction answers why a familiar service can be at risk while still using a strong approved symmetric cipher: its session key, storage key or root of trust may depend on something else.

Integrity and authenticity

Digital signatures protect identity and integrity, including for signed software releases, trust anchors and authenticated documents. A future capability against existing signing keys could undermine confidence in who approved an artifact; that is distinct from reading historical communications. A material leak today and a trust-chain failure tomorrow call for different contingency planning. [130] [129]

Do not infer that all symmetric encryption, hashes or key-management functions need the same replacement as public-key mechanisms. NIST does not expect to require a wholesale move away from current symmetric standards for this migration. In practice, validate both the primitives and the overall trust design. A secure algorithm cannot repair stale keys, undisclosed recovery paths, a corrupted policy store or a rollout that omits a dependency. [129] [138]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Harvest risk starts before a new machine exists

FIELD NOTE

Scope defense by retention, authorized access and data in transit

Exposure can begin during collection

The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence distinguishes harvest-now, decrypt-later risk: sensitive encrypted information retained today may still be valuable when future cryptanalytic capabilities exist. Whether this materializes depends on what was collected, the original protections, the time value of confidentiality and the resources an adversary eventually has. Migration cannot retroactively replace protections on copies already outside an organization's control. [131] [129]

Inventory classes whose sensitivity outlasts routine technology refresh. Examples include health records, contractual archives, trade secrets and protected identities. A long business retention period is not necessarily a long confidentiality period, so obtain the data owner's assessment.

A defensible starting order

Start with long-lived sensitive data in transit, then check storage and backup key management as applicable. Record the route actually used by a record and whether external services terminate and recreate communications protection. Minimize unnecessary copies and retention in line with legitimate obligations. Retain organizational context for legal records and avoid deleting evidence required by policy. [139] [129]

For a fictional service whose records need ten more years of confidentiality and whose migration could take four, “we can wait for clearer hardware evidence” is not necessarily a defensible answer. Those numbers are planning inputs, not a quantum-arrival estimate. Elevate cases where lengthy migrations, irreversible disclosure or weak control over custody overlap, and reassess annually as timelines and asset ownership change. [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

The first three standards solve different problems

FIELD NOTE

Key establishment: FIPS 203

Digital signatures: FIPS 204 and 205

What was approved

FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM, a key-encapsulation mechanism that helps establish a shared secret. FIPS 204 specifies the module-lattice-based signature scheme ML-DSA. FIPS 205 specifies the stateless hash-based signature scheme SLH-DSA. These are algorithms for conventional computing infrastructure; an organization does not need quantum hardware to adopt them. A signature scheme cannot substitute for a key-establishment mechanism, or vice versa. [130] [131]

Cryptographic diversity provides options across deployment constraints and helps manage dependency on a single mathematical family. It does not eliminate the need for rigorous verification of the implementation and its integration.

A candidate is not a product certification

NIST selected HQC as an additional key-encapsulation option in 2025. The October 2026 transition guidance still describes an HQC standard as under development and separately discusses additional signature work. Selection, standard publication, protocol integration, module validation and secure deployment are independent milestones. [140] [129]

Organizations should ask which service functions a vendor covers, which versions and supported platforms are in scope, and what evidence shows security is active rather than simply available. Prefer vetted library and protocol support appropriate to policy; do not design a custom construction or treat an algorithm name as an assurance statement. Document approval and compatibility for transit protection and software signatures separately. [138] [139]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Federal deadlines do not forecast quantum hardware

FIELD NOTE

U.S. dates cover different instruments, system scopes and control types

Read the final timeline

Under June 2026 Executive Order 14412 and OMB M-26-15, the most sensitive federal systems follow a faster track. NIST IR 8547 gives December 31, 2030 for key establishment and December 31, 2031 for digital signatures on federal high-value assets and high-impact systems, and describes prioritizing comparable high-sensitivity systems. OMB's memorandum does not apply to national security systems, which have distinct policies and should be assessed against applicable guidance. [132] [133] [129] [134]

NIST's broad trajectory is deprecation of vulnerable public-key mechanisms after 2030 and disallowance under its standards and guidance after 2035. These are not predictions for a machine or blanket deadlines for every firm.

Avoid three calendar errors

First, federal support for TLS 1.3 by January 2, 2030 is a platform step, not proof that post-quantum key establishment or signatures are in use. Second, do not use the general 2035 transition as permission to defer high-priority assets with earlier applicable dates. Third, an order directing work on a contractor rule does not establish that the proposed requirements are already final or apply to a particular contract. Check actual clauses and subsequent rules with qualified advice. [132] [133] [129]


For multi-market organizations publish an applicability table: authority, asset class, required behavior, deadline, evidence owner and latest source. When dates differ, use the applicable schedule and consider taking reversible preparatory action early. [138]

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 12 PQC deadlines are not quantum arrival dates



NIST approved FIPS 203, 204 and 205 in August 2024. NIST summarizes accelerated federal deadlines for certain high-priority systems and a 2035 transition target, with general NIST disallowance after 2035. The dates describe standards and federal planning obligations, not predictions of a cryptographically relevant machine.

NIST IR 8547 final, October 2026: primary source

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

National roadmaps should be compared by scope

FIELD NOTE

Dates: U.K. 2028 / 2031 / 2035

Canadian federal non-classified roadmap: 2026 / 2031 / 2035

EU coordination: high-risk by end-2030

The United Kingdom and Canada

The UK NCSC targets initial discovery and a migration plan by 2028, highest-priority migration by 2031, and completion across systems, services and products by 2035. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's roadmap for federal non-classified systems sets an April 2026 initial departmental plan and progress reporting, high-priority completion by end 2031 and remaining systems by end 2035. These sources use different institutional scopes and “completion” can depend on how vulnerable functions are handled. [135] [136]

A side-by-side date chart can inform staffing and procurement, but neither comparison nor coincident dates establish mutual recognition, identical control definitions or uniform enforcement.

European Union and supplier sequencing

The EU coordinated roadmap asks for a phased start and prioritizes high-risk cases no later than the end of 2030. Its status should not be confused with every member country's applicable requirements or laws. Check sector obligations, cloud locality and contractual roles before assuming that one baseline controls all assets. [137]

An international network can have cryptography enforced by software developers, cloud providers, device vendors and customer-controlled trust operations. Record which jurisdiction's guidance applies to a service and which party can deploy each change. For a partner connection, ask when both sides can support interoperable transport and what happens while only one side has transitioned. Include the older endpoint population separately, instead of letting an average hide it. [138] [139]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Physical qubits are not logical computing capacity

FIELD NOTE

Error correction turns a hardware demonstration into evidence only for the scope tested

The pivotal measurement

A physical qubit is a quantum hardware element. A logical qubit is encoded so that a larger system can protect quantum information against errors. The relationship is not fixed: physical quality, architecture, encoding, control errors, measurement, decoding and the intended workload change overhead. In the [*REDACTED*] below-threshold memory study, a 101-physical-qubit configuration encoded a distance-seven logical memory with 0.143% ± 0.003 percentage points error per correction cycle. The memory result was published online in December 2024. [141]

That is not 101 usable logical qubits; nor does the reported error rate describe every gate, scaling behavior or workload on another device.

Broader constraints

A controlled memory demonstration is still meaningful. Improving the error rate as the tested code size grows supports the prospect of scaling. But an operational computation needs multiple logical operations, sustained error control, long runs, clean orchestration and usable throughput. Hardware packaging, calibration, control electronics and manufacturing can impede repeatability and scale. The published study also reports rare correlated errors, a reason not to extrapolate a typical error rate mechanically. [141]

Read milestone reports for the tested logical task, wall-clock run duration, error metric and comparison baseline. Device counts from incompatible architectures do not by themselves rank their practical capabilities. Watch for separately verified demonstrations covering whole workloads under realistic operating conditions. [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Quantum benchmarks answer narrow questions

FIELD NOTE

A result can establish laboratory progress without proving a new general capability

A benchmark is a defined problem

[*REDACTED*] described [*REDACTED*] in October 2025 as a demonstration on a set of benchmarking circuits measuring a quantum observable. Reproducibility across relevant systems and comparisons with known classical methods make the result interesting. It does not establish that the computer accelerates arbitrary software, that the advantage extends to all inputs, or that it can break any real cryptographic protections. A revised classical baseline may alter the comparative claim without invalidating the underlying physical experiment. [144]

In October 2026, [*REDACTED*] also reported error improvements in a [*REDACTED*] experiment addressing a component of fault-tolerant quantum computation. Strong evidence for the component is not completion of the full machine. [142]

Evidence categories for procurement

Separate theoretical complexity results, simulations, calibrated laboratory observations, validated pilots and end-to-end commercially useful performance. Ask if resource claims refer to logical or physical units, if preprocessing and readout are included, and whether competing methods use comparable quality targets and up-to-date hardware. Avoid treating sponsor roadmaps and teaser demonstrations as independent corroboration. [141] [144] [145]

In a defensive monitoring program, update technical scenarios when the evidence changes enough to alter a real dependency. Usable signals include error correction across larger systems, reliable end-to-end computation, clearer reproducibility or better vendor support for migration. Hardware skepticism is not a reason to defer inventory; that work is useful even if expectations move later. [138]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

AI can assist quantum research without creating AGI

FIELD NOTE

Research support runs largely on classical systems; a quantum benchmark is not a model-performance benchmark

Classical AI for a quantum task

REDACTED is a neural decoder trained to infer error information for quantum error correction. The research tests a specific bottleneck using simulated and experimental data. Better decoding may help preserve encoded quantum information, but this does not remove fabrication and scaling constraints or automatically extend to lower latency or future architectures. A neural network assisting a quantum device is not the same as a neural network being trained on a quantum computer. [143] [141]

AI may also help analyze experiments or prioritize design alternatives. Demonstrate the benefit experimentally, count engineering time and failures, and assess how well it transfers.

Quantum computation for AI tasks

Proposed quantum applications for learning include specialized classification, dimension reduction and physical simulation. A 2026 study demonstrates theoretical results under particular access and comparison assumptions and gives application examples. That is not a general inference speedup or proof that fully operational devices with the claimed logical capacity exist. Require accounting for data access, error correction, input/output, comparison baselines and cost before carrying a specialized result into AI production plans. [145]

AGI is a separate and contested claim about breadth and adaptability. Neither a quantum experiment nor a benchmark on one model assistance task establishes general autonomy, open-ended competence or reliable control. These technologies can develop in parallel without converging into a single event. [147] [148]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Singularity is a scenario, not a dated event

FIELD NOTE

Differentiate assistance, autonomous work, feedback acceleration and loss of effective control

Translate the label into testable claims

The term “singularity” is used for an hypothesized rapid transformation in capabilities, sometimes connected to AI systems improving the research processes that produce later systems. It is not an engineering milestone with a single accepted definition. Break it into narrower observable claims: does AI assistance raise quality-adjusted research output, across which tasks, with what level of human work, and over what period? Then ask whether faster outputs persist through data, validation, compute and deployment bottlenecks. [149] [148]

Automation in code or experiments may speed useful pieces of a pipeline without automation of the entire pipeline.

Distinguish acceleration from loss of control

METR's November 2026 assessment of one company's October research and development found evidence consistent with meaningful assistance under measured conditions, and identified reasons its estimates could be too high or too low. Internal self-reports, model access and benchmark selection do not establish a counterfactual economy-wide rate or autonomy without human oversight. [148]

The International AI Safety Report distinguishes relevant precursors from the sustained bundle of capability and access contemplated by loss-of-control scenarios. Experts disagree about likelihood and pathways. A defensible control agenda does not require a precise probability: preserve independent authorization, the ability to revoke capability and access, observations that could invalidate assumptions, and a tested ability to pause and recover. [147]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

A convergence scenario needs independent conditions

FIELD NOTE

The future threat changes only when capability, resources, deployment and trust failures coincide

Scenario: faster research, delayed hardware

A capable tool speeds experimental analysis and design, but equipment availability and dependable error correction still constrain the rate of hardware scaling. More measurements are possible; the usable workload does not immediately expand. Under this scenario the organization should continue standard migration on schedule, evaluate improvements for applicability, and not weaken ordinary identity and access controls in anticipation of hypothetical quantum activity. [143] [141] [129]

Evidence changing the scenario would include repeated, independently corroborated end-to-end engineering gains rather than new claims based on the same benchmark.

Scenario: financial and institutional controls break first

An agent may acquire broad authority because teams want to save time, long before a quantum device can materially affect production cryptography. If logs are absent, supervisors lack time to review actions, or credentials cannot be revoked independently, better mathematical protections do not cure the governance failure. A simultaneous pressure to update cryptography can amplify operational load and make change control more difficult. [147] [138]

Set separate triggers for model permissions and cryptographic readiness. Rehearse stopping automated work safely, preserving logs and restoring known authorized behavior. Require authorized people with tested access to decide the next step. Avoid tying an organization's readiness to an AGI declaration, a prediction market, a speculative hardware date or an unverified provider headline. [147] [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Build a cryptographic inventory that can be verified

FIELD NOTE

Know every covered service and evidence owner, not merely every vendor

Identify actual uses

List applications and environments, cryptographic function, protocols, algorithms, key and certificate ownership, data lifetime, vendor dependencies, hosting boundary, hardware limitations and available telemetry. Prioritize externally exposed flows, high-value data and long-lived verification roots. Keep storage, transit, signing and recovery paths separate. Procurement claims and product configurations are inputs, not proof production is using a particular mechanism. [139] [129]

Where discovery is incomplete, state which inventory method was used and where manual or vendor confirmation is outstanding. Publish confidence bands or counts by evidence stage rather than an estate-wide percentage based on assumed coverage.

Assign an owner to every unresolved item

A dependable record has an accountable service owner, root cause of the barrier, latest release or replacement milestone, and a mitigation or exception expiration. Include dependency owners who can change gateways and certificate chains, not simply the team paying the invoice. Track externally managed services and cryptographic hardware and firmware that may require replacement. [138] [135]

Validate samples of production negotiations where authorized; an advertised feature can coexist with unprotected segments. A provider's September 2026 visibility tooling is an example of distinguishing client-facing and backend protection in practice, not evidence for every network or any particular organization's configuration. [146]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Build crypto agility without creating fragile fallback

FIELD NOTE

Three measures: supported function, observed use, tested recovery

Flexibility is a security property

Crypto agility means the ability to replace or adapt cryptographic mechanisms without sacrificing security or continuity. It includes protocol options, configuration ownership, centrally maintained software dependencies, replacement paths for firmware, certificate lifecycle readiness and policy enforcement. More settings are not automatically more agility: unowned or unrestricted switching can create ambiguity and increase reliance on obsolete defaults. [138]

Select supported configurations and test them in owned environments. Establish a written decision rule for failure, a boundary on fallback and a process for retiring vulnerable paths. Do not extend exceptions indefinitely because an obsolete dependency is expensive.

The transition period is measurable

Run a narrowly scoped pilot before broad adoption. Compare service success, failure modes, latency, resource use and backward compatibility with prior configuration. Include infrastructure limits and device populations; key, message and signature sizes are deployment inputs, not proof of operational performance. Confirm trust path behavior, key rotation, monitoring and interruption recovery through authorized exercises. [139] [129]

Measure agreed denominators: migrated high-priority connections as a fraction of all enumerated high-priority connections; tests passed by normalized environment; exception count, severity and age. Identify unobservable routes; a green score from a partial population can be misleading. Require official protocol and vendor guidance, and document why a temporary exception is bounded and approved. [138] [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Signing and archival trust need their own plan

FIELD NOTE

Firmware and regulated records can live beyond the issuing service

Identify who will verify older artifacts

A signed release, document or firmware package may be checked long after it was issued. Record verifiers, future trust material, reissuance options, existing timestamp evidence and the consequences of rejecting an old object. Distinguish ability to validate a legacy object from authority to produce a new one. Note whether older field devices can accept new trust material and whether a reachable maintenance process exists. [129] [138]

Prioritize long-lived assets where delayed migration is expensive or where loss of a trust anchor would shut down a critical service. Set compatibility bounds so a transition does not silently preserve outdated protection indefinitely.

Make recovery independent of the failed path

Consider a fictional fleet that can receive new signing keys only through the update process the organization wishes to replace. The recovery question is not merely whether new signatures exist, but whether the verifier can acquire a trustworthy new root if the old process must be retired. Plan and test a vendor-supported, authorized transition path before a cutoff. Maintain protected backups of trust configuration and rehearse replacement and validation. [135] [138]

Archive validation may involve durable provenance, timestamps, or re-attestation where suitable. Requirements depend on law, contractual obligations, and industry policy. Avoid revoking all old credentials, discarding evidence, or treating ordinary operational re-signing as a substitute for specialist legal review. [129] [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Prepare a rebound plan for failed migrations

FIELD NOTE

If a control rollout causes disruption, recover within an approved protection boundary

What failure can look like

A phased rollout can disrupt a partner connection, device enrollment or certificate-verification chain if dependencies behave differently in production. This can be operationally serious without being a breach. Document the symptom, which trust functions are affected, and whether confidentiality or integrity was actually impaired. Preserve telemetry and bring the service owner and incident lead into the same decision process. [139] [138]

Maintain a roster of who can stop a rollout, where configuration evidence lives and which service continuity obligations constrain the response. Logs should capture actual controls in use without revealing secrets.

Test the rebound before the emergency

For approved test changes, define an authorized rollback and expected outcome. If any provisional fallback is needed, evaluate its exposure, scope, end date and approval requirements; do not normalize continuing on unsafe paths. Identify priority services that should isolate a route rather than silently drop safeguards. Capture observations before and after remediation so success means both restored operations and restored protection. [138] [131]

Measure time to detection, verified restoration, restoration of the intended guarded state, and number of exceptions left open. Update runbooks and dependency inventories after the exercise. Recovery that recreates obsolete trust across more of the system is not a rebound. [138]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

Known, disputed and unknown claims need different action

FIELD NOTE

Do not use the unknown as a reason for paralysis or as evidence for a claim

Well evidenced and actionable

NIST has approved three principal standards, issued final transition timelines and supplied discovery and agility guidance. Public experimental work has shown scoped improvement in quantum error correction. Public reports identify continued uncertainty about autonomous AI systems and loss of control. These facts can justify defensive preparation now. None supplies a precise date for a general cryptanalytic machine, a probability of disaster or evidence that an operational attack succeeded. [130] [129] [141] [147]

When analysis references a provider claim, include its benchmark, denominator, date and what corroboration is available. Preserve contrary results and changes to methods.

Open questions and leading indicators

Watch incomplete inventories, hard-to-replace roots of trust, costs across real deployment populations, changes in error-correction scale, and independent replication. For convergence, track measured human workload after AI assistance, the duration and authority under which agents act, and whether containment still works after a vendor or service failure. The largest unknown may be not raw capability but whether organizations deploy it with insufficient independent oversight. [138] [148] [147]

Escalate on meaningful evidence: overdue vendor commitments for critical systems, confirmed breaks in coverage, loss of auditability or verified claims that change a tested assumption. Avoid forecasting by combining unrelated trend lines. Publish what evidence would cause a risk rating or migration priority to change, with a date and owner. [131]

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QUANTUM COMPUTING AND FRONTIER SCENARIOS

A practical sequence for the next twelve months

FIELD NOTE

Suggested operating cadence; follow applicable directives and approved controls

First 90 days: discover and assign

Assign a cryptography lead, an AI deployment owner and an incident decision-maker. Create the initial inventory and prioritize long-lived sensitive information, externally reachable services and verification roots. Collect vendor roadmaps and note where primary evidence is absent. Select one high-priority service and one low-risk pilot that tests readiness without exposing sensitive material. Track actual use alongside available support. [139] [135]

For systems using AI agents, document permission boundaries, human approvals and trusted logs. Ask whether a non-agent process can revoke authority and restore known behavior if the system or its provider fails. [147]

Next quarters: test, assess and fund

Use approved standards and authorized environments to pilot changes; verify relevant parties, including earlier devices and recovery processes. Separate key establishment and signatures on the dashboard. Define expected migration stages, safe recovery, exceptions and which milestones warrant new funding. Communicate with vendors and partners before their own replacement windows close. [129] [138]


Complete an executive review that reports actual coverage, unmeasured populations, unresolved dependencies and validated recovery. Reassess against new official guidance and independently evaluated milestones rather than a forecast for a singularity event. For small operators, a verified vendor path plus an owner, dates and tests can be more useful than a sophisticated risk score with unsupported inputs. [131]

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 13 Post-quantum migration is a staged program



Start with cryptographic and dependency inventory, prioritize sensitive long-lived information and important services, then pilot and phase migration. Track compatibility, vendor support, rollback and residual legacy exposure. Milestones are operational, not forecasts of future hardware capability.

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

A first-day incident decision card

FIELD NOTE

Illustrative defensive workflow. Activate only within your authority and preserve safety and evidence.

Stabilize and establish command

Confirm operational impact, appoint an incident lead and identify affected service owners. Use contact details and a communications channel not dependent on the suspect environment. Record time-stamped facts, decisions and assumptions; designate who handles external communication, privacy and legal review. If safety-critical operations are involved, consult the responsible operations team before altering system state. [3]

Protect evidence appropriate to the situation and avoid uncontrolled access to sensitive records. Decide which access or service to limit, check continuity options, and record what the action is intended to accomplish. Not every event needs the same containment action.

Define a safe return

Before restoration, establish what clean means for identities, systems, data and dependencies. Restore limited functions first if safe, validate with accountable owners and monitor for recurrence. Communicate known facts, unknowns, expected service and the next update, and identify any reporting obligations with counsel. Avoid promises of total recovery before the evidence supports them. [13] [3]

Afterward, distinguish immediate fixes from systemic changes. Test whether the same failure would spread as far after changes. Give each corrective action a deadline, owner and an observable closure condition. A report without a retest is not a finished recovery process.

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Identity must survive a primary outage

FIELD NOTE

A breach of the central identity system can affect both production and response.

Prepare for the identity dependency

Map where staff, service accounts, vendors and agents authenticate. Flag which permissions can change records, credentials, payments or production settings. Require separate high-impact identities and minimize permanent privilege. Plan carefully tested emergency access that does not reuse the same failure path, with documented oversight and secure storage. [6] [5]

Confirm that key response, backup and communications tools can be reached independently under approved emergency conditions. Define who holds recovery materials and how access is reviewed after use. Remove stale and unnecessary access according to policy.

Verify recovery rather than assume it

Test revocation and restoration using authorized exercises. Record how long it took to restore validated access to each priority service. Check that emergency accounts cannot become unattended privileged entry points. During recovery, validate both direct logins and the relationships between services rather than only restoring one visible control.

For agent identities, require separate credentials, tight scope, short duration, and revocation through an authoritative service. Make sure people can halt downstream work even when the model interface is unavailable. Approval and identity changes should be reconstructible afterward through appropriate logs. [8] [3]

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Prove that backups can restore services

FIELD NOTE

An intact copy is not the same as a known-good and dependable service.

Define the sequence with operations

Agree which data, systems, identities, configuration, interfaces and communications are required for the first usable service. Set a service restoration target and a maximum acceptable data loss window. Document trusted versions and backup custody. Preserve additional boundaries between backup administration and normal production management. [13] [5]

A backup exercise should measure the time and staff effort to restore, plus application correctness. For a school or health system, meaningful metrics may include the ability to identify users safely, reconcile records and operate in an independent continuity mode.

Observe the difference between resumption and rebound

A service can launch before volumes return to normal. Measure reconciliation backlog, errors, user notification completion and support burden. Verify that software, identity and data were restored from sources supported by evidence. Preserve the ability to stop rollout if conditions change.

Test a partial restore and a wider restore with an important supplier withheld. After exercise, correct dependency maps and capacity assumptions. Close remediation only after someone not responsible for the original change verifies the evidence. The goal is to restore trust and service, not simply improve a downtime metric. [3] [13]

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Design supplier controls around failure modes

FIELD NOTE

Ask who can detect, revoke, restore and notify when the supplier is unavailable.

Obtain verifiable supplier evidence

Map dependencies by service, data and permission. Identify whether critical suppliers administer environments, process identities, deliver updates or hold recovery records. Ask how they isolate tenants, document authorized changes and support revocation or recovery. Ask what is actually included in audit and testing scope. [4]

Specify needed notification, response, evidence sharing, support and restoration terms before deployment. The party operating the infrastructure may not be the same party with legal reporting obligations or authority to suspend testing. Plan ownership explicitly.

Practice reduced dependency

When a single partner fails, practice returning to a limited but safe service. Confirm you can access essential data and records through approved paths; test replacement options and know expected limits. If a partner proposes an agent or new integration, reassess data boundaries and permissions instead of assuming it fits the existing agreement. [3] [8]

Track a portfolio of concentrated dependencies across the enterprise. Different suppliers may rely on the same platform, and separate products can share credentials or operators. Escalate cases where contractual remedies exist but no operational fallback can be demonstrated.

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Gate AI actions at more than one layer

FIELD NOTE

Scores and policies support release decisions; tested controls determine what can actually happen.

Three levels of authority

First, allow an agent to read a specified scope and make recommendations. Next, allow low-impact reversible changes within an explicit budget and log them. Finally, keep high-impact actions subject to fresh, independent human approval and a separate execution permission. Prefer denying unknown scope rather than inferring authority from user-facing language. [8] [6]

Approval needs context: show the proposed change, affected resources, source evidence, relevant policy and reversal plan. Don’t make the approver depend on a natural-language assertion for correctness. Verify the decision at the tool boundary and invalidate it when circumstances materially change.

Test failures and recovery

Use harmless fixtures and nonproduction records. Test appropriate stopping, appropriate continuation, stale approvals, tool unavailability, revocation, clock delays, and loss of logging. Use separate evaluators and affected-role reviewers when possible. Evaluate oversensitive refusals and missed stops separately; both affect business operation and safety. [9]

Require run budgets, scope-limited credentials, traceable actions, a human stop mechanism and operator visibility. Exercise the ability to terminate a running workflow without depending on its cooperation. Canary releases and controlled rollbacks should be appropriate to the operating environment; none removes the need for real ownership.

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Run a nontechnical tabletop with useful measurements

FIELD NOTE

Choose decisions that would be hard to make in the first hour, not a scripted hero outcome.

The scenario

A critical service is disrupted, user reports arrive through different channels, a vendor cannot confirm scope, and executives request a rapid return. Later, a purported internal instruction appears in an agent-managed workflow while the usual approver is unavailable. Keep the exercise focused on decision rights, facts and service continuity. No network access or attack simulation is required. [3]

Ask who can declare an incident, who manages continuity, how to confirm communications, when to suspend automated actions, and what evidence is required to restore each service. Record disagreements without treating them as errors before review.

Measures and follow-through

Track time to accountable command, time to confirmed alternatives, duration before high-impact automation was held, time to validated priority recovery, and extent of reliable records. Report medians only with adequate samples and show major tail cases. Describe whether a measure came from an exercise or actual incident. [13]

Take remedial actions with accountable owners, dates and retest requirements. Use variations in who is absent, which supplier fails and whether the usual communications system is trusted. This reveals whether backup authority and fallback modes exist beyond an idealized exercise.

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Unknowns that can be monitored

FIELD NOTE

Each uncertain claim needs evidence that would make you change the assessment.

Specify the uncertainty

For harmful actors using AI, distinguish provider-observed examples from incidence and outcomes. For more capable agents, look for replicated independent evidence conditioned on tool access, and for controls that keep working after model or workflow changes. For general intelligence, specify broad capability, transfer and reliability criteria before assigning a label. [8] [10] [9]

For quantum risk, monitor advances in error correction, logical operations, duration and validated application-scale resources. Monitor migration readiness separately: published standards, validated products, compatibility, inventory coverage and vendor deadlines. Progress in one column can change planning without proving another.

Public policy and institutional response

Track who has authority to report, decide, update standards and require remediation, distinguishing a proposal from an operative decision. Where law or standards differ by geography, ask appropriate specialists to confirm applicability. Avoid republishing sensitive incident facts or mislabeling a payment recovery as full operational recovery.


A change log should record the last verification date, denominator or scope, the decision that depends on it and the next scheduled check. Do not treat lack of public disclosure as proof that a capability or incident is absent. Use testable internal milestones even when the outside scenario remains uncertain.

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VISUAL EVIDENCE

Exhibit 14 Evidence, inference and unknowns are different



Keep documented performance, conditional extrapolation and unresolved questions separate. Ask what evidence would change the judgment. Evidence from a narrow test does not establish broad autonomy, generalized intelligence, or the timing of a hypothetical discontinuity.

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DEFENSIVE CONTROLS AND RESILIENCE

Conclusions and practical next steps

FIELD NOTE

Build verifiable defenses that remain useful even if frontier forecasts are wrong.

What history and current data support

Cyber harm has expanded in some reporting measures, while the old trust assumptions still fail. Reported complaint losses do not quantify all attacks. Selected evidence of AI misuse supports preparations for speed and scale, not a claim that broadly autonomous attacks are ubiquitous. The important historical distinction is between limiting damage, bringing back a trusted service, and changing controls to prevent repetition. [1] [10] [3]

Start with essential services and identity dependencies. Test verified recovery and supplier fallback. Ask what stops an automated system from making changes when its user, tool, policy or evidence is unreliable.

What to prepare without pretending to predict

Inventory public-key uses and prioritize long-lived sensitive data and trust anchors. Plan interoperable migration against standards and validate performance and recovery. Track actual capability measures and emerging obligations without assuming a quantum breakthrough proves AGI or that AGI guarantees a singularity. [11] [12]

The strongest next investment is not a confident forecast. It is evidence that the organization can detect consequential changes, limit propagation, recover the services people need, and improve after the event. Assign owners, test the thresholds and report unknowns explicitly.

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Primary source register

CITATIONS

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[1] Federal Bureau of Investigation · 2025 IC3 Annual Report

[2] [*REDACTED*] · 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report

[3] NIST · SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations

[4] NIST · The Cybersecurity Framework 2.0

[5] CISA · Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals

[6] NIST · SP 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture

[7] NIST · SP 800-216, Recommendations for Federal Vulnerability Disclosure Guidelines

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Jonathan G. Browning

Jonathan G. Browning is the Founder & CEO of 48PEGASUS and a co-author of this paper. His professional background includes strategy and operations leadership in energy and real estate, with experience designing business workflows, implementing CRM and reporting systems, and assessing how AI and automation fit operational decisions.

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